Collective Actions in Europe : : A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic Analysis.
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Superior document: | SpringerBriefs in Law Series |
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Place / Publishing House: | Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2019. {copy}2019. |
Year of Publication: | 2019 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | SpringerBriefs in Law Series
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Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (132 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Preface
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- References
- 2 Why Are Collective Actions Needed in Europe: Small Claims Are Not Reasonably Enforced in Practice and Collective Actions Ensure Effective Access to Justice
- 2.1 What Are the Hurdles Faced by Small Claims in Europe
- 2.2 How Do Collective Actions Overcome the Above Hurdles and Why Are They Efficient?
- 2.3 Why Are Collective Actions Not Working Spontaneously if They Are Efficient?
- 2.4 How Could Collective Actions Be Made Work?
- 2.5 Summary
- References
- 3 Major European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id
- 3.1 European Objections Against Class Actions: Scruples or Pretexts?
- 3.1.1 Constitutional Concerns: Private Autonomy and Tacit Adherence
- 3.1.2 Opt-Out Collective Actions Are Alien to Continental Legal Traditions
- 3.1.3 It Is Very Difficult to Identify the Members of the Group and to Prove Group Membership
- 3.1.4 Opt-Out Collective Actions Would Lead to a Litigation Boom and Would Create a Black-Mailing Potential for Group Representatives
- 3.2 The Headspring of European Taboos and Traditionalism: Party Autonomy and the State's Prerogative to Enforce the Public Interest
- 3.3 Summary
- References
- 4 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing
- 4.1 Disparate Regulatory Environments
- 4.2 Why Should Europeans Not Fear the American Cowboy? Diverging Effects of Disparate Regulatory Environments
- 4.3 The Novel Questions of Collective Actions in Europe
- 4.3.1 Funding in the Absence of One-Way Cost-Shifting, Contingency Fees and Punitive Damages
- 4.3.2 Two-Way Cost-Shifting
- 4.3.3 Distrust of Market-Based Mechanisms in the Enforcement of Public Policy (No Private Attorney General)
- 4.3.4 European Opt-In Collective Actions and Joinders of Parties
- 4.3.5 Opt-Out Systems and the "Only Benefits" Principle.
- 4.4 Summary
- References
- 5 European Models of Collective Actions
- 5.1 The European Landscape: To Opt in or to Opt Out?
- 5.2 Purview: Step-by-Step Evolution of a Precautious Revolution
- 5.3 Pre-requisites of Collective Action and Certification
- 5.4 Standing and Adequate Representation
- 5.5 Status of Group Members in Opt-in Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs and Res Judicata Effect
- 5.6 Status of Group Members in Opt-Out Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs, Res Judicata Effect and the "Only Benefits" Principle
- 5.7 Enforcement
- 5.8 Summary
- References
- 6 Conclusions
- 6.1 Collective Actions Are Needed in Europe to Ensure Access to Justice and Effectiveness of the Law
- 6.2 European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id
- 6.3 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing
- 6.4 European Models of Collective Actions: A Transsystemic Overview
- 6.5 Closing Thoughts: "Small Money, Small Football, Big Money, Big Football"
- References.