Collective Actions in Europe : : A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic Analysis.

• Superior document: SpringerBriefs in Law Series
• Author: Nagy, Csongor István.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2019.; {copy}2019.
• Year of Publication: 2019
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: SpringerBriefs in Law Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (132 pages)

Table of Contents

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 Why Are Collective Actions Needed in Europe: Small Claims Are Not Reasonably Enforced in Practice and Collective Actions Ensure Effective Access to Justice -- 2.1 What Are the Hurdles Faced by Small Claims in Europe -- 2.2 How Do Collective Actions Overcome the Above Hurdles and Why Are They Efficient? -- 2.3 Why Are Collective Actions Not Working Spontaneously if They Are Efficient? -- 2.4 How Could Collective Actions Be Made Work? -- 2.5 Summary -- References -- 3 Major European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id -- 3.1 European Objections Against Class Actions: Scruples or Pretexts? -- 3.1.1 Constitutional Concerns: Private Autonomy and Tacit Adherence -- 3.1.2 Opt-Out Collective Actions Are Alien to Continental Legal Traditions -- 3.1.3 It Is Very Difficult to Identify the Members of the Group and to Prove Group Membership -- 3.1.4 Opt-Out Collective Actions Would Lead to a Litigation Boom and Would Create a Black-Mailing Potential for Group Representatives -- 3.2 The Headspring of European Taboos and Traditionalism: Party Autonomy and the State's Prerogative to Enforce the Public Interest -- 3.3 Summary -- References -- 4 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing -- 4.1 Disparate Regulatory Environments -- 4.2 Why Should Europeans Not Fear the American Cowboy? Diverging Effects of Disparate Regulatory Environments -- 4.3 The Novel Questions of Collective Actions in Europe -- 4.3.1 Funding in the Absence of One-Way Cost-Shifting, Contingency Fees and Punitive Damages -- 4.3.2 Two-Way Cost-Shifting -- 4.3.3 Distrust of Market-Based Mechanisms in the Enforcement of Public Policy (No Private Attorney General) -- 4.3.4 European Opt-In Collective Actions and Joinders of Parties -- 4.3.5 Opt-Out Systems and the "Only Benefits" Principle.

4.4 Summary -- References -- 5 European Models of Collective Actions -- 5.1 The European Landscape: To Opt in or to Opt Out? -- 5.2 Purview: Step-by-Step Evolution of a Precautious Revolution -- 5.3 Pre-requisites of Collective Action and Certification -- 5.4 Standing and Adequate Representation -- 5.5 Status of Group Members in Opt-in Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs and Res Judicata Effect -- 5.6 Status of Group Members in Opt-Out Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs, Res Judicata Effect and the "Only Benefits" Principle -- 5.7 Enforcement -- 5.8 Summary -- References -- 6 Conclusions -- 6.1 Collective Actions Are Needed in Europe to Ensure Access to Justice and Effectiveness of the Law -- 6.2 European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id -- 6.3 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing -- 6.4 European Models of Collective Actions: A Transsystemic Overview -- 6.5 Closing Thoughts: "Small Money, Small Football, Big Money, Big Football" -- References.