Pathways and Consequences of Legal Irregularity : : Senegalese Migrants in France, Italy and Spain.

• Superior document: IMISCOE Research Series
• Author: Vickstrom, Erik R.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2019.; ©2019.
• Year of Publication: 2019
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: IMISCOE Research Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (233 pages)

Table of Contents

• Pathways and Consequences of Legal Irregularity
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• 1.1 What Is Irregularity?
• 1.2 Multiple Contexts of Reception, Complex Configurations of Legal Status, and the Consequences of Irregularity
• 1.3 Variation in Legal Contexts of Reception Is Crucial for Understanding the Pathways into and Consequences of Irregularity
• 1.4 Simplified Operationalizations of Legal Status Hamper Understanding of Irregularity
• 1.5 So What? When, How, and Why Does Irregularity Matter?
• 1.6 Senegal as a Strategic Site for Migration Research
• 1.7 The Migration Between Africa and Europe (MAFE) Project
• 1.7.1 Sampling Design of the MAFE Project
• 1.7.2 MAFE Questionnaires
• 1.7.3 Advantages of the MAFE Data
• Inclusion of Regular and Irregular Migrants
• Longitudinal Measurement of Legal Status
• Comparability of Legal Statuses
• 1.7.4 Limitations of the MAFE Data
• Sample Size
• Recall Bias
• Time Resolution
• Standardization of Heterogeneous Legal Statuses
• The Murkiness of Legal Status
• References
• Chapter 2: Evolution of Immigration-Control Policies in France, Italy, and Spain
• 2.1 Policy Evolution in Multiple Contexts of Reception
• 2.2 France
• 2.2.1 Colonial "Assimilation" and Citizenship
• 2.2.2 Link Between Colonial-Era Policies and Migration
• 2.2.3 Post-War Reconstruction and the Importation of Foreign Labor
• The General Regime of the Ordinance of 1945
• Decolonization and the Creation of a Preferential Regime
• 2.2.4 The 1960s: The Special Regime of the Bilateral Accord and Widespread Irregularity
• Senegalese Independence, the Preferential Regime, and "Immigration Sauvage"
• The General Regime: Post-facto Regularization as the Norm
• The End of Regularization and the Suspension of Labor Immigration.
• 2.2.5 The 1970s: The "Closing" of the French Border and the Erosion of the Bilateral Accord
• Establishment of the Carte de Séjour Requirements for Senegalese
• 2.2.6 The 1980s: Immigration Policy as a Political Football and Consensus in Border Security
• 2.2.7 Visa Requirements for Senegalese and the Re-negotiated Bilateral Accord of 1995
• Unilateral Imposition of Visa Requirements in 1986
• New Bilateral Accord
• 2.2.8 The 1990s: Pasqua, Debré, and the Sans-Papiers Movement
• 2.2.9 The 2000s: Selective Immigration and Coordinated Migration Management
• 2.3 Senegalese Migration to New Destinations in Southern Europe
• 2.4 Italy
• 2.4.1 Pre-1986: Italian Emigration and the Fragmentation of Immigration Policy
• Mechanisms of Internal Control
• Mechanisms of External Control
• 2.4.2 1986-1998: National-Level Immigration Policy and "Moral Panic"
• 2.4.3 The 2000s: "Strong Restrictive Ambition"
• 2.5 Spain
• 2.5.1 1970s-1999: European Integration
• 2.5.2 2000-2008: Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners, Alien Affairs, and Plan África
• The Arrival of the Cayucos in the Canary Islands and Spain's "Plan África"
• 2.6 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 3: Pathways into Irregular Legal Status of Senegalese Migrants France, Italy, and Spain
• 3.1 Conceptual Approaches to Irregularity
• 3.1.1 The Legal and Social Production of Irregularity
• 3.1.2 Multidimensionality of Irregularity
• 3.1.3 Incomplete State Control and Migrant Agency
• 3.1.4 Pathways into Irregularity
• Geographic Flows into Irregularity and Mechanisms of External Control: No-Visa Entry
• Status Flows into Irregularity and Mechanisms of Internal Control: Overstaying and Befallen Irregularity
• 3.2 Hypotheses
• 3.3 Data and Methods
• 3.3.1 Sample
• 3.3.2 Legal Status Variables
• 3.3.3 Predictor Variables
• 3.3.4 Models
• No-Visa Entry
• Overstaying.
• Befallen Irregularity
• Estimation and Presentation of Models
• 3.4 Results
• 3.4.1 No-Visa Entry
• 3.4.2 Pathway: Overstaying
• 3.4.3 Pathway: Befallen Irregularity
• 3.5 Discussion
• 3.6 Conclusion
• Appendix: Raw Coefficient Estimates for Models of Pathways into Irregularity
• References
• Chapter 4: Legal Status, Gender, and Economic Incorporation of Senegalese Migrants in France, Italy, and Spain
• 4.1 Gendered Channels of Migration: Family Reunification, Legal Status, and Dependency
• 4.1.1 Reunification and Gendered Economic and Administrative Dependency
• 4.1.2 Family Reunification Regimes and Configurations of Legal Status
• 4.2 Reunified Women and the Labor Market
• 4.3 Limitations of Existing Research
• 4.3.1 Assuming Participation: Undocumented Status and Wages in the US
• 4.3.2 Ethnic Penalties on Employment in Europe, but Limited Measures of Legal Status
• 4.4 Gender Norms, Family Reunification, and Work Among Senegalese Migrants
• 4.5 Hypotheses
• 4.6 Data and Methods
• 4.6.1 The Analytic Sample
• 4.6.2 Outcome Variables
• Economic Activity
• 4.6.3 Predictor Variables
• Legal Status and Context of Reception
• Location of Spouse/Partner
• Human, Social, and Migration-Specific Capital
• Context of Exit
• 4.6.4 Models
• First-Year Economic Activity
• Transitions into and out of Employment
• 4.7 Results
• 4.7.1 Gender, Partner Location, and Legal Status
• 4.7.2 First-Year Economic Activity
• 4.7.3 Transitions out of Employment for Men
• 4.7.4 Transitions into Employment for Women
• 4.8 Discussion
• 4.9 Conclusion
• Appendix: Raw Coefficient Estimates for Models in this Chapter
• References
• Chapter 5: Legal Status, Territorial Confinement, and Transnational Activities of Senegalese Migrants in France, Italy, and Spain
• 5.1 Types of Transnational Activities.
• 5.2 The Role of the State in Migrant Transnational Activities
• 5.3 Homeland Visits and Territorial Confinement of Migrants with Irregular Status
• 5.4 Blocked Transnationalism and Structural Exclusion
• 5.5 Affective Ties, Homeland Visits, and Non-mobile Transnational Activities
• 5.6 Caging Non-mobile Transnational Activities
• 5.7 Transnational Activities of Senegalese Migrants
• 5.8 Hypotheses
• 5.9 Data and Methods
• 5.9.1 Data Source
• 5.9.2 The Analytic Sample
• 5.9.3 Outcome Variables
• 5.9.4 Predictor Variables
• 5.9.5 Models
• 5.9.6 Estimating Indirect Effects in a Non-linear Framework
• 5.10 Results
• 5.10.1 Descriptive Results
• 5.10.2 Multivariate Results
• Hypothesis 1: Territorial Confinement
• Short Returns
• Hypothesis 2: Blocked Transnationalism/Structural Exclusion
• Remitting
• Investing
• HTA Participation
• Hypothesis 3: Maintenance of Affective Ties
• Direct Effect of Short Returns on Non-mobile Transnational Activities
• Direct Effect of Other Affective Ties (Spouse, Children, Other Family Ties)
• Direct Effect of Other Circulation-Related Variables
• Hypothesis 4: Caging and Indirect Effects of Legal Status Via Short Returns
• 5.11 Discussion
• 5.12 Conclusion
• Appendices
• Appendix A: Wording of Questions on Transnational Activities in MAFE-Senegal Questionnaire
• Appendix B: Raw Coefficient Estimates for Models from this Chapter
• References
• Chapter 6: Conclusion
• 6.1 Evolution of Immigration-Control Policies in France, Italy, and Spain
• 6.2 Pathways into Irregular Legal Status
• 6.3 Legal Status, Gender, and Labor Market Incorporation
• 6.4 Legal Status and Transnational Activities
• 6.5 What Is Irregularity and Why Does It Matter?
• 6.6 Implications for Policy
• 6.6.1 The Unintended Consequences of Immigration Policy.
• 6.6.2 Co-development, Veiled Restriction, and the African "Capacity Crisis"
• References
• Correction to: Pathways and Consequences of Legal Irregularity
• Correction to: E. R. Vickstrom, Pathways and Consequences of Legal Irregularity, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12088-7.