Competition Authorities in South Eastern Europe : : Building Institutions in Emerging Markets.

• Superior document: Contributions to Economics Series
• Author: Begović, Boris.
• TeilnehmendeR: Popović, Dusan V.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2018.; {copy}2018.
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Contributions to Economics Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (227 pages)

Table of Contents

• Intro
• Foreword
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Introduction
• Western Balkans and the Design of Effective Competition Law: The Role of Economic, Institutional and Cultural Characteristics
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Models of Competition Policy Regime
• 2.1 Institutional Set-Up
• 2.1.1 The General Model and the Independence and Accountability of the Competition Authority
• 2.1.2 Scope of the Enforcement and Other Powers
• 2.1.3 Investigative and Sanctioning Power
• 2.1.4 Implementation of the Rules
• 2.1.5 Interpretation of the Substantive Rules
• 2.1.6 Sanction Policy
• 2.1.7 Priority Setting
• 3 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy
• 3.1 Economic Characteristics
• 3.1.1 Barriers to Entry and the Role of the Government
• 3.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output/Domestic Consumption
• 3.1.3 Informal Economy
• 3.2 Institutional Characteristics
• 3.3 Cultural Characteristics
• 4 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy
• 4.1 Economic Characteristics
• 4.1.1 Barriers to Entry, Economic Activity and the Role of the State
• 4.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output
• 4.1.3 Informal Economy
• 4.2 Institutional Characteristics
• 4.3 Cultural Characteristics
• 5 Conclusions
• References
• Middle Income Convergence Trap and the Role of Competition Policy in SEE Countries
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Engines of Economic Growth: The Mechanics of Middle Income Convergence Trap
• 3 Different Competition Policies for Different Per Capita Income Levels?
• 4 SEE Countries: In the Middle of the Convergence Trap?
• 5 Elements of Competition Policy for the SEE Countries
• 6 Conclusion
• References
• Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit Legal Transplant and Its Ramifications
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Duty to Introduce State Aid Control.
• 3 Types of State Aid Authorities in SEE Countries
• 3.1 Authority Closely Linked to the Government
• 3.2 Independent Authority Accountable to Parliament
• 4 Concluding Remarks: The Reasons for Inefficiency
• References
• Antitrust, Mergers, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under the Same Roof: Does Political Compromise Prevail over the Expert A...
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Institutional Capacities
• 3 Competition Authorities: What Should They Protect
• 4 How Should Competition Authorities Be Organised?
• 5 Antitrust, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under One Roof
• 6 Concluding Remarks
• References
• Realigning Competition Advocacy Priorities in the Context of Economic Adjustment Programmes: The Greek Case
• 1 Introduction
• 2 State-of-Play Before the Adjustment Programme
• 3 Increased Focus on Advocacy: Realigned Strategy
• 4 Liberalization of Professional Services
• 5 Greeceś OECD Competition Assessment Project
• 5.1 First Competition Assessment Project
• 5.2 Second Competition Assessment Project
• 5.3 Third Competition Assessment Project
• 6 Other Initiatives Regarding Regulatory Distortions Mostly Affecting Retail and the Food Supply Chain
• 7 Overall Progress: Indices
• 8 Competition Compliance and Awareness Guides and Other Outreach Activities
• 8.1 Trade Associations
• 8.2 Public Procurement and Bid-Rigging
• 8.3 Franchising
• 8.4 Regulatory Impact Assessment: Legislative Process
• 9 Concluding Remarks
• References
• The Role of Competition Advocacy: The Serbian Experience
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Definition and Importance of Competition Advocacy
• 3 Competencies of the Serbian Commission
• 4 Serbian Experience
• 4.1 Non-binding Opinions
• 4.2 Advocacy with Local Authorities
• 4.3 Market Studies
• 4.4 Cooperation with Sector Regulators
• 4.5 Building Public Awareness of Competition Policy.
• 5 Lessons Learnt
• 6 Conclusion
• References
• Considerations Determining the Extent of Economic Analysis and the Choice of Legal Standards in Competition Law Enforcement
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Considerations that Influence the Choice of Legal Standards and the Extent of Economic Analysis in CL Enforcement
• 2.1 Welfare-Related Considerations
• 2.2 The Role of the Substantive Standard (SS)
• 2.3 The Effect of Reputation on the Choice of Standards
• 3 A Practical Approach to Choosing Legal Standards that Minimise Decision Errors
• 4 Concluding Remarks
• References
• Three Economistś Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-technical Introduction
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Critical Loss Analysis
• 2.1 Critical Loss Analysis for Market Definition
• 2.1.1 Implicit Elasticities
• 2.1.2 Cost Estimates: Marginal vs. Variable, Constant vs. Fixed
• 2.1.3 The SSNIP
• 2.1.4 Market Definition Is Not the Whole Story
• 2.2 Critical Loss Analysis for Unilateral Effects Analysis
• 3 Upward Pricing Pressure
• 3.1 How to Use GUPPI?
• 3.2 GUPPI to UPP
• 3.3 The Diversion Ratio
• 3.4 The Limits of UPP and GUPPI
• 4 The Vertical Arithmetic
• 5 Conclusion
• References
• Pricing Benchmark in Market Definition: Theoretical Background and Practical Application
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Methodological Approach to Defining the Relevant Market
• 3 Theoretical Foundations of Price-Based Tests
• 3.1 Price Correlation Analysis
• 3.2 Stationarity Test
• 3.3 Cointegration Test
• 3.4 Granger Causality Test
• 4 Summary of Case Studies
• 5 Practical Application of Price-Based Tests
• 5.1 Price Correlation Test
• 5.2 Stationarity Test (Unit Root Test)
• 5.3 Cointegration Test
• 5.4 Granger Causality Test
• 6 Conclusion
• References
• The Rationale for Using the Classic Cournot Mechanism in Merger Control
• 1 Introduction.
• 2 The Rationale for Cournot Mechanism
• 2.1 Cournot Mechanism as the Reduced Form of the Two-Stage Competition
• 2.1.1 Second Stage-Pricing Subgame
• 2.1.2 First Stage-The Choice of Capacities
• 2.2 Cournotś Mechanism and Traditional Unilateral Effects Reasoning
• 3 Cournotś Model and Calibrated Merger Simulation
• 3.1 Demand and Cost Functional Form
• 3.2 Model Calibration
• 4 Concluding Remarks
• References
• Difference-in-Differences as a Tool for Ex-Post Analysis of Mergers: The Case of a Merger in the Romanian Retail Market
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Difference-in-Differences Technique
• 3 Applying the Methodology: Main Assumptions and Decisions
• 4 Results
• 5 Conclusions
• References.