Competition Authorities in South Eastern Europe : : Building Institutions in Emerging Markets.

• Superior document: Contributions to Economics Series
• Author: Begović, Boris.
• TeilnehmendeR: Popović, Dusan V.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2018.; {copy}2018.
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Contributions to Economics Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (227 pages)

Table of Contents

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction -- Western Balkans and the Design of Effective Competition Law: The Role of Economic, Institutional and Cultural Characteristics -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Models of Competition Policy Regime -- 2.1 Institutional Set-Up -- 2.1.1 The General Model and the Independence and Accountability of the Competition Authority -- 2.1.2 Scope of the Enforcement and Other Powers -- 2.1.3 Investigative and Sanctioning Power -- 2.1.4 Implementation of the Rules -- 2.1.5 Interpretation of the Substantive Rules -- 2.1.6 Sanction Policy -- 2.1.7 Priority Setting -- 3 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy -- 3.1 Economic Characteristics -- 3.1.1 Barriers to Entry and the Role of the Government -- 3.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output/Domestic Consumption -- 3.1.3 Informal Economy -- 3.2 Institutional Characteristics -- 3.3 Cultural Characteristics -- 4 Emerging Economies and the Shape of Competition Policy -- 4.1 Economic Characteristics -- 4.1.1 Barriers to Entry, Economic Activity and the Role of the State -- 4.1.2 Sectoral Composition of Output -- 4.1.3 Informal Economy -- 4.2 Institutional Characteristics -- 4.3 Cultural Characteristics -- 5 Conclusions -- References -- Middle Income Convergence Trap and the Role of Competition Policy in SEE Countries -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Engines of Economic Growth: The Mechanics of Middle Income Convergence Trap -- 3 Different Competition Policies for Different Per Capita Income Levels? -- 4 SEE Countries: In the Middle of the Convergence Trap? -- 5 Elements of Competition Policy for the SEE Countries -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Institutional Design of State Aid Authorities in South East Europe: The Unfit Legal Transplant and Its Ramifications -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Duty to Introduce State Aid Control.

3 Types of State Aid Authorities in SEE Countries -- 3.1 Authority Closely Linked to the Government -- 3.2 Independent Authority Accountable to Parliament -- 4 Concluding Remarks: The Reasons for Inefficiency -- References -- Antitrust, Mergers, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under the Same Roof: Does Political Compromise Prevail over the Expert A... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Institutional Capacities -- 3 Competition Authorities: What Should They Protect -- 4 How Should Competition Authorities Be Organised? -- 5 Antitrust, State Aid and Consumer Protection Under One Roof -- 6 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Realigning Competition Advocacy Priorities in the Context of Economic Adjustment Programmes: The Greek Case -- 1 Introduction -- 2 State-of-Play Before the Adjustment Programme -- 3 Increased Focus on Advocacy: Realigned Strategy -- 4 Liberalization of Professional Services -- 5 Greeceś OECD Competition Assessment Project -- 5.1 First Competition Assessment Project -- 5.2 Second Competition Assessment Project -- 5.3 Third Competition Assessment Project -- 6 Other Initiatives Regarding Regulatory Distortions Mostly Affecting Retail and the Food Supply Chain -- 7 Overall Progress: Indices -- 8 Competition Compliance and Awareness Guides and Other Outreach Activities -- 8.1 Trade Associations -- 8.2 Public Procurement and Bid-Rigging -- 8.3 Franchising -- 8.4 Regulatory Impact Assessment: Legislative Process -- 9 Concluding Remarks -- References -- The Role of Competition Advocacy: The Serbian Experience -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Definition and Importance of Competition Advocacy -- 3 Competencies of the Serbian Commission -- 4 Serbian Experience -- 4.1 Non-binding Opinions -- 4.2 Advocacy with Local Authorities -- 4.3 Market Studies -- 4.4 Cooperation with Sector Regulators -- 4.5 Building Public Awareness of Competition Policy.

5 Lessons Learnt -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Considerations Determining the Extent of Economic Analysis and the Choice of Legal Standards in Competition Law Enforcement -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Considerations that Influence the Choice of Legal Standards and the Extent of Economic Analysis in CL Enforcement -- 2.1 Welfare-Related Considerations -- 2.2 The Role of the Substantive Standard (SS) -- 2.3 The Effect of Reputation on the Choice of Standards -- 3 A Practical Approach to Choosing Legal Standards that Minimise Decision Errors -- 4 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Three Economistś Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-technical Introduction -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Critical Loss Analysis -- 2.1 Critical Loss Analysis for Market Definition -- 2.1.1 Implicit Elasticities -- 2.1.2 Cost Estimates: Marginal vs. Variable, Constant vs. Fixed -- 2.1.3 The SSNIP -- 2.1.4 Market Definition Is Not the Whole Story -- 2.2 Critical Loss Analysis for Unilateral Effects Analysis -- 3 Upward Pricing Pressure -- 3.1 How to Use GUPPI? -- 3.2 GUPPI to UPP -- 3.3 The Diversion Ratio -- 3.4 The Limits of UPP and GUPPI -- 4 The Vertical Arithmetic -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Pricing Benchmark in Market Definition: Theoretical Background and Practical Application -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Methodological Approach to Defining the Relevant Market -- 3 Theoretical Foundations of Price-Based Tests -- 3.1 Price Correlation Analysis -- 3.2 Stationarity Test -- 3.3 Cointegration Test -- 3.4 Granger Causality Test -- 4 Summary of Case Studies -- 5 Practical Application of Price-Based Tests -- 5.1 Price Correlation Test -- 5.2 Stationarity Test (Unit Root Test) -- 5.3 Cointegration Test -- 5.4 Granger Causality Test -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- The Rationale for Using the Classic Cournot Mechanism in Merger Control -- 1 Introduction.

2 The Rationale for Cournot Mechanism -- 2.1 Cournot Mechanism as the Reduced Form of the Two-Stage Competition -- 2.1.1 Second Stage-Pricing Subgame -- 2.1.2 First Stage-The Choice of Capacities -- 2.2 Cournotś Mechanism and Traditional Unilateral Effects Reasoning -- 3 Cournotś Model and Calibrated Merger Simulation -- 3.1 Demand and Cost Functional Form -- 3.2 Model Calibration -- 4 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Difference-in-Differences as a Tool for Ex-Post Analysis of Mergers: The Case of a Merger in the Romanian Retail Market -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Difference-in-Differences Technique -- 3 Applying the Methodology: Main Assumptions and Decisions -- 4 Results -- 5 Conclusions -- References.