The Stability of Currency Boards.

• Superior document: Cege-Schriften Series ; v.8
• Author: Stukenbrock, Kai.
• Place / Publishing House: Frankfurt a.M. : : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,, 2004.; Ã2004.
• Year of Publication: 2004
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Cege-Schriften Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (242 pages)

Table of Contents

• Cover
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• List of Variables
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Currency Boards-An Overview
• 2.1 Basic Features of a Currency Board
• 2.1.1 Definition of a Currency Board
• 2.1.2 Currency Boards vs Central Banks
• 2.1.3 Flexibility in Design
• 2.2 Currency Board Characteristics
• 2.2.1 Credibility and Macroeconomic Stability
• 2.2.2 The Adjustment Process and Market Flexibility
• 2.2.3 Anchor Currency Selection-A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas Perspective
• 2.2.4 Monetary Policy, Lender of Last Resort Support, and Financial Fragility
• 2.2.5 Fiscal Policy
• 2.3 Conclusion
• 3 Past and Present Currency Boards
• 3.1 History of Currency Boards
• 3.1.1 General Overview
• 3.1.2 Foundations
• 3.1.3 The First Currency Boards (1849-1912)
• 3.1.4 The West African Currency Board (1913)
• 3.1.5 The Peak and Decline of the Currency Board System (1913-1974)
• 3.2 Hong Kong (1983)
• 3.2.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board
• 3.2.2 Currency Board Design
• 3.2.3 Currency Board Performance
• 3.3 Argentina (1991-2002)
• 3.3.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board
• 3.3.2 Currency Board Design
• 3.3.3 The Early Years of the Currency Board and the Tequila Crisis
• 3.3.4 The Late Years and Currency Board Exit
• 3.4 Estonia (1992) and Lithuania (1994)
• 3.4.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Boards
• 3.4.2 Currency Boards Design
• 3.4.3 Currency Boards Performance
• 3.4.4 Accession to the European Union and the European Monetary Union
• 3.5 Bulgaria (1997)
• 3.5.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board
• 3.5.2 Currency Board Design
• 3.5.3 Currency Board Performance
• 3.6 Summary
• 4 Stability and Instability of Currency Boards-a Theoretical Analysis
• 4.1 Models of Currency Crises
• 4.1.1 First and Second Generation Currency Crises Models
• 4.1.2 Critique of Second Generation Crises Models.
• 4.1.3 Classification of the Currency Board Crises Model
• 4.2 The Standard Model
• 4.2.1 Model Outline
• 4.2.2 Discretionary Exchange Rate Policy
• 4.2.3 Fixed Exchange Rate and Time-Inconsistency
• 4.2.4 Political Cost of Devaluation and Incomplete Information
• 4.2.5 Possible Equilibria
• 4.2.5.1 FC equilibrium
• 4.2.5.2 ZC equilibrium
• 4.2.5.3 PC equilibria
• 4.2.5.4 Graphical Representation and Multiple Equilibria
• 4.2.5.5 Model Parameters and Types of Equilibria
• 4.2.6 Inter-temporal Linkages and Dynamic Effects
• 4.2.7 Stability of the Currency Board
• 4.2.7.1 Gains from Increased Credibility
• 4.2.7.2 Destabilization through Unemployment
• 4.2.7.3 Destabilization through a Sequence of PC Equilibria
• 4.2.7.4 Employment-Decreasing Shocks
• 4.2.7.5 Conclusion
• 4.2.8 Loss from Exit
• 4.3 The Model with Debt
• 4.3.1 Possible Effects of Foreign-Currency Debt on the Model Economy
• 4.3.2 Unemployment
• 4.3.3 Discretionary and Fixed Exchange Rate Policy
• 4.3.4 Model Equilibria
• 4.3.5 Graphical Representation and Interpretation of the Modified Model
• 4.3.6 Model Dynamics and Resilience to Shocks
• 4.3.7 Loss from Exit and Conclusion
• 5 Conclusion
• 5.1 Currency Board Selection
• 5.2 Currency Board Stability
• 5.3 The Risks
• 5.4 Outlook
• Appendices
• A Currency Boards 1849-2002 Overview
• B Currency Board Design Features
• C Derivation of Equations
• C.1 The Standard Model
• C.1.1 Derivation of Devaluation and Loss Equations (4.6) and (4.7)
• C.1.2 Proof that (4.9) Greater than (4.11)
• C.1.3 Difference Loss Fixed and Loss Discretionary Exchange Rate
• C.1.4 Derivation of Equation (4.19), Expected Devaluation
• C.1.5 Derivation of Unemployment Equation (4.24)
• C.1.6 Derivation of Unemployment Equation (4.28)
• C.1.7 Derivation of critical value for c (4.30).