The Stability of Currency Boards.

• Superior document: Cege-Schriften Series ; v.8
• Author: Stukenbrock, Kai.
• Place / Publishing House: Frankfurt a.M. : : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,, 2004.; Ã2004.
• Year of Publication: 2004
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Cege-Schriften Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (242 pages)

Table of Contents

Cover -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Variables -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Currency Boards-An Overview -- 2.1 Basic Features of a Currency Board -- 2.1.1 Definition of a Currency Board -- 2.1.2 Currency Boards vs Central Banks -- 2.1.3 Flexibility in Design -- 2.2 Currency Board Characteristics -- 2.2.1 Credibility and Macroeconomic Stability -- 2.2.2 The Adjustment Process and Market Flexibility -- 2.2.3 Anchor Currency Selection-A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas Perspective -- 2.2.4 Monetary Policy, Lender of Last Resort Support, and Financial Fragility -- 2.2.5 Fiscal Policy -- 2.3 Conclusion -- 3 Past and Present Currency Boards -- 3.1 History of Currency Boards -- 3.1.1 General Overview -- 3.1.2 Foundations -- 3.1.3 The First Currency Boards (1849-1912) -- 3.1.4 The West African Currency Board (1913) -- 3.1.5 The Peak and Decline of the Currency Board System (1913-1974) -- 3.2 Hong Kong (1983) -- 3.2.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board -- 3.2.2 Currency Board Design -- 3.2.3 Currency Board Performance -- 3.3 Argentina (1991-2002) -- 3.3.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board -- 3.3.2 Currency Board Design -- 3.3.3 The Early Years of the Currency Board and the Tequila Crisis -- 3.3.4 The Late Years and Currency Board Exit -- 3.4 Estonia (1992) and Lithuania (1994) -- 3.4.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Boards -- 3.4.2 Currency Boards Design -- 3.4.3 Currency Boards Performance -- 3.4.4 Accession to the European Union and the European Monetary Union -- 3.5 Bulgaria (1997) -- 3.5.1 Lead-Up to the Currency Board -- 3.5.2 Currency Board Design -- 3.5.3 Currency Board Performance -- 3.6 Summary -- 4 Stability and Instability of Currency Boards-a Theoretical Analysis -- 4.1 Models of Currency Crises -- 4.1.1 First and Second Generation Currency Crises Models -- 4.1.2 Critique of Second Generation Crises Models.

4.1.3 Classification of the Currency Board Crises Model -- 4.2 The Standard Model -- 4.2.1 Model Outline -- 4.2.2 Discretionary Exchange Rate Policy -- 4.2.3 Fixed Exchange Rate and Time-Inconsistency -- 4.2.4 Political Cost of Devaluation and Incomplete Information -- 4.2.5 Possible Equilibria -- 4.2.5.1 FC equilibrium -- 4.2.5.2 ZC equilibrium -- 4.2.5.3 PC equilibria -- 4.2.5.4 Graphical Representation and Multiple Equilibria -- 4.2.5.5 Model Parameters and Types of Equilibria -- 4.2.6 Inter-temporal Linkages and Dynamic Effects -- 4.2.7 Stability of the Currency Board -- 4.2.7.1 Gains from Increased Credibility -- 4.2.7.2 Destabilization through Unemployment -- 4.2.7.3 Destabilization through a Sequence of PC Equilibria -- 4.2.7.4 Employment-Decreasing Shocks -- 4.2.7.5 Conclusion -- 4.2.8 Loss from Exit -- 4.3 The Model with Debt -- 4.3.1 Possible Effects of Foreign-Currency Debt on the Model Economy -- 4.3.2 Unemployment -- 4.3.3 Discretionary and Fixed Exchange Rate Policy -- 4.3.4 Model Equilibria -- 4.3.5 Graphical Representation and Interpretation of the Modified Model -- 4.3.6 Model Dynamics and Resilience to Shocks -- 4.3.7 Loss from Exit and Conclusion -- 5 Conclusion -- 5.1 Currency Board Selection -- 5.2 Currency Board Stability -- 5.3 The Risks -- 5.4 Outlook -- Appendices -- A Currency Boards 1849-2002 Overview -- B Currency Board Design Features -- C Derivation of Equations -- C.1 The Standard Model -- C.1.1 Derivation of Devaluation and Loss Equations (4.6) and (4.7) -- C.1.2 Proof that (4.9) Greater than (4.11) -- C.1.3 Difference Loss Fixed and Loss Discretionary Exchange Rate -- C.1.4 Derivation of Equation (4.19), Expected Devaluation -- C.1.5 Derivation of Unemployment Equation (4.24) -- C.1.6 Derivation of Unemployment Equation (4.28) -- C.1.7 Derivation of critical value for c (4.30).