Models in Microeconomic Theory : : Expanded Second Edition (She).
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| Place / Publishing House: | Cambridge, UK : : Open Book Publishers,, 2023. Ã2023. |
| Year of Publication: | 2023 |
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Language: | English |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (382 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Personal note
- Preface
- Part I Individual behavior
- 1 Preferences and utility
- 1.1 Preferences
- 1.2 Preference formation
- 1.3 An experiment
- 1.4 Utility functions
- Problems
- Notes
- 2 Choice
- 2.1 Choice and rational choice
- 2.2 Rationalizing choice
- 2.3 Property alpha
- 2.4 Satisficing
- 2.5 The money pump argument
- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality
- Problems
- Notes
- 3 Preferences under uncertainty
- 3.1 Lotteries
- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries
- 3.3 Expected utility
- 3.4 Theory and experiments
- 3.5 Risk aversion
- Problems
- Notes
- 4 Consumer preferences
- 4.1 Bundles of goods
- 4.2 Preferences over bundles
- 4.3 Monotonicity
- 4.4 Continuity
- 4.5 Convexity
- 4.6 Differentiability
- Problems
- Notes
- 5 Consumer behavior
- 5.1 Budget sets
- 5.2 Demand functions
- 5.3 Rational consumer
- 5.4 Differentiable preferences
- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function
- 5.6 Properties of demand functions
- Problems
- Notes
- 6 Producer behavior
- 6.1 The producer
- 6.2 Output maximization
- 6.3 Profit maximization
- 6.4 Cost function
- 6.5 Producers' preferences
- Problems
- Notes
- 7 Monopoly
- 7.1 Basic model
- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market
- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly
- 7.4 Implicit discrimination
- Problems
- Notes
- Part II Equilibrium
- 8 A jungle
- 8.1 Model
- 8.2 Equilibrium
- 8.3 Pareto stability
- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle
- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation?
- 8.6 Externalities
- Problems
- Notes
- 9 A market
- 9.1 Model
- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium
- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability
- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium
- Problems
- Notes
- 10 An exchange economy
- 10.1 Model.
- 10.2 Competitive equilibrium
- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium
- 10.4 Reopening trade
- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability
- 10.6 The core
- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions
- 10.8 Manipulability
- 10.9 Edgeworth box
- Problems
- Notes
- 11 Variants of an exchange economy
- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money
- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty
- Problems
- Notes
- 12 A market with consumers and producers
- 12.1 Production economy
- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor
- Problems
- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations
- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches
- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection
- 13.3 A fishing economy
- Problems
- Notes
- 14 A market with asymmetric information
- 14.1 Introductory model
- 14.2 Labor market with education
- Problems
- Notes
- Part III Game theory
- 15 Strategic games
- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium
- 15.2 Basic examples
- 15.3 Economic examples
- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium
- 15.5 Strictly competitive games
- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium
- 15.7 Mixed strategies
- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium
- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium
- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium
- Problems
- Notes
- 16 Extensive games
- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium
- 16.2 What is a strategy?
- 16.3 Backward induction
- 16.4 Bargaining
- 16.5 Repeated games
- Problems
- Notes
- Part IV Topics
- 17 Mechanism design
- 17.1 Deciding on a public project
- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms
- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
- Problems
- Notes
- 18 Matching
- 18.1 The matching problem
- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm
- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability
- Problems
- Notes
- 19 Socialism
- 19.1 Model
- 19.2 Properties of economic systems
- 19.3 Characterization of socialism.
- Problems
- Notes
- 20 Aggregating preferences
- 20.1 Social preferences
- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions
- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions
- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem
- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Problems
- Notes
- References
- Index.