Models in Microeconomic Theory : : Expanded Second Edition (She).

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
:
TeilnehmendeR:
Place / Publishing House:Cambridge, UK : : Open Book Publishers,, 2023.
Ã2023.
Year of Publication:2023
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (382 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id 50030604787
ctrlnum (MiAaPQ)50030604787
(Au-PeEL)EBL30604787
(OCoLC)1402819582
collection bib_alma
record_format marc
spelling Osborne, Martin J.
Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
1st ed.
Cambridge, UK : Open Book Publishers, 2023.
Ã2023.
1 online resource (382 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model.
10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism.
Problems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Electronic books.
Rubinstein, Ariel.
Print version: Osborne, Martin J. Models in Microeconomic Theory Cambridge, UK : Open Book Publishers,c2023
ProQuest (Firm)
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=30604787 Click to View
language English
format eBook
author Osborne, Martin J.
spellingShingle Osborne, Martin J.
Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model.
10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism.
Problems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index.
author_facet Osborne, Martin J.
Rubinstein, Ariel.
author_variant m j o mj mjo
author2 Rubinstein, Ariel.
author2_variant a r ar
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
author_sort Osborne, Martin J.
title Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_sub Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_full Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_fullStr Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_full_unstemmed Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_auth Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
title_new Models in Microeconomic Theory :
title_sort models in microeconomic theory : expanded second edition (she).
publisher Open Book Publishers,
publishDate 2023
physical 1 online resource (382 pages)
edition 1st ed.
contents Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model.
10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism.
Problems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index.
isbn 9781805111238
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=30604787
illustrated Not Illustrated
oclc_num 1402819582
work_keys_str_mv AT osbornemartinj modelsinmicroeconomictheoryexpandedsecondeditionshe
AT rubinsteinariel modelsinmicroeconomictheoryexpandedsecondeditionshe
status_str n
ids_txt_mv (MiAaPQ)50030604787
(Au-PeEL)EBL30604787
(OCoLC)1402819582
carrierType_str_mv cr
is_hierarchy_title Models in Microeconomic Theory : Expanded Second Edition (She).
author2_original_writing_str_mv noLinkedField
marc_error Info : Unimarc and ISO-8859-1 translations identical, choosing ISO-8859-1. --- [ 856 : z ]
_version_ 1792331070865145857
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05496nam a22003853i 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">50030604787</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">MiAaPQ</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240229073850.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d | </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr cnu||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240229s2023 xx o ||||0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781805111238</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(MiAaPQ)50030604787</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(Au-PeEL)EBL30604787</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1402819582</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MiAaPQ</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield><subfield code="e">pn</subfield><subfield code="c">MiAaPQ</subfield><subfield code="d">MiAaPQ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Osborne, Martin J.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Models in Microeconomic Theory :</subfield><subfield code="b">Expanded Second Edition (She).</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1st ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, UK :</subfield><subfield code="b">Open Book Publishers,</subfield><subfield code="c">2023.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">Ã2023.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (382 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion -- Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes -- 7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor -- Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium -- 15.9 Correlated equilibrium -- 15.10 S(1) equilibrium -- Problems -- Notes -- 16 Extensive games -- 16.1 Extensive games and subgame perfect equilibrium -- 16.2 What is a strategy? -- 16.3 Backward induction -- 16.4 Bargaining -- 16.5 Repeated games -- Problems -- Notes -- Part IV Topics -- 17 Mechanism design -- 17.1 Deciding on a public project -- 17.2 Strategy-proof mechanisms -- 17.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism -- Problems -- Notes -- 18 Matching -- 18.1 The matching problem -- 18.2 Gale-Shapley algorithm -- 18.3 Gale-Shapley algorithm and stability -- Problems -- Notes -- 19 Socialism -- 19.1 Model -- 19.2 Properties of economic systems -- 19.3 Characterization of socialism.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Problems -- Notes -- 20 Aggregating preferences -- 20.1 Social preferences -- 20.2 Preference aggregation functions -- 20.3 Properties of preference aggregation functions -- 20.4 Arrow's impossibility theorem -- 20.5 Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- Problems -- Notes -- References -- Index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="590" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electronic books.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rubinstein, Ariel.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="a">Osborne, Martin J.</subfield><subfield code="t">Models in Microeconomic Theory</subfield><subfield code="d">Cambridge, UK : Open Book Publishers,c2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="797" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest (Firm)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=30604787</subfield><subfield code="z">Click to View</subfield></datafield></record></collection>