Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate /

Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate / / prepared by Christopher Crowe.

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Superior document:IMF working paper ; WP/06/256
:
ProQuest (Firm)
Crowe, Christopher.
TeilnehmendeR:
ProQuest (Firm)
Year of Publication:2006
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.
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Physical Description:41 p.
Notes:"November 2006."
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record_format marc
spelling Crowe, Christopher.
Goal-independent central banks [electronic resource] : why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
41 p.
IMF working paper ; WP/06/256
"November 2006."
Includes bibliographical references.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
Banks and banking, Central.
Monetary policy.
Electronic books.
ProQuest (Firm)
IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=3014343 Click to View
language English
format Electronic
eBook
author Crowe, Christopher.
spellingShingle Crowe, Christopher.
Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
IMF working paper ;
author_facet Crowe, Christopher.
ProQuest (Firm)
ProQuest (Firm)
author_variant c c cc
author2 ProQuest (Firm)
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
author_corporate ProQuest (Firm)
author_sort Crowe, Christopher.
title Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
title_sub why politicians decide to delegate /
title_full Goal-independent central banks [electronic resource] : why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
title_fullStr Goal-independent central banks [electronic resource] : why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
title_full_unstemmed Goal-independent central banks [electronic resource] : why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
title_auth Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
title_new Goal-independent central banks
title_sort goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
series IMF working paper ;
series2 IMF working paper ;
publisher International Monetary Fund,
publishDate 2006
physical 41 p.
callnumber-first H - Social Science
callnumber-subject HG - Finance
callnumber-label HG1811
callnumber-sort HG 41811 C76 42006
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=3014343
illustrated Not Illustrated
oclc_num 698585545
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hierarchy_sequence WP/06/256.
is_hierarchy_title Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate /
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