Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate / / prepared by Christopher Crowe.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:IMF working paper ; WP/06/256
:
TeilnehmendeR:
Year of Publication:2006
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.
Online Access:
Physical Description:41 p.
Notes:"November 2006."
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100 1 |a Crowe, Christopher. 
245 1 0 |a Goal-independent central banks  |h [electronic resource] :  |b why politicians decide to delegate /  |c prepared by Christopher Crowe. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2006. 
300 |a 41 p. 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/06/256 
500 |a "November 2006." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
533 |a Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking, Central. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy. 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a ProQuest (Firm) 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/06/256. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=3014343  |z Click to View