Self-Preferencing in Online Search : : Under Article 6(5) DMA.

• Author: Höppner, Thomas.
• Place / Publishing House: Baden-Baden : : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,, 2024.; ©2024.
• Year of Publication: 2024
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (217 pages)

Table of Contents

Cover -- A. Executive summary -- I. Principles for identifying a distinct First-Party Service that shall not be favoured -- II. Principles for identifying a Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- III. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- B. Legal, technical, and economic background -- I. Article 6(5) DMA in a nutshell -- 1. Equal treatment: The DMA's central obligation -- 2. Objectives: contestability and fairness -- a. Addressing gatekeeper's conflicts of interest -- b. Addressing platform envelopment strategies -- c. Covering any form of self-preferencing in online search -- 3. Gatekeeper's choice: (i) disintegrate own service, or (ii) integrate third parties equally without conferring an advantage upon the gatekeeper -- 4. The relevant criteria for compliance -- II. Identifying a distinct First-Party Service -- 1. Legal framework for the delineation of digital services -- a. Annex D(2): integrated services with different purposes or falling within different categories of CPS are always distinct -- b. Application to Article 6(5) DMA -- aa) Consequences for designated CPS -- bb) Application to other gatekeeper services -- 2. Definition of an OSE -- a. Irrelevance of the current design of search engines -- b. Definition in the DMA -- c. Qualification in the case law of the Court of Justice -- 3. Identifying a distinct service -- a. Objective: the DMA's aim to effectively curb platform envelopment strategies -- aa) The economic concept of platform envelopment -- bb) Platform envelopment pursuant to the DMA -- cc) Legal consequence: 'Distinct services' despite common components -- b. Services found to be distinct from an OSE -- 4. Delineation of OSEs from particular other services -- a. OSE vs non-search related services -- b. OSE vs search-related content.

c. OSE vs (generative AI) answering services -- d. OSE vs OISs -- aa) OSE and OIS cannot form a single service -- bb) Differences between an OSE and an OIS -- (1) Definition of an OIS -- (2) Navigating the web vs facilitating transactions -- i. End users' perspective -- ii. Business users' perspective -- iii. Relevant factors -- (3) Crawling of websites vs direct contracts with business users -- cc) The example of Alphabet: on Google's shift to integrating specialised search and intermediation services -- (1) Google Search became market leader by limiting itself to an OSE -- (2) Limits of Google's OSE in facilitating transactions -- (3) Google's specialised search technology to facilitate transactions -- dd) Google's OISs as distinct services - findings in Google Search (Shopping) -- e. OSE vs non-OIS specialised search services -- f. Borderline between OSE and OIS/verticals in case of overlapping elements -- 5. In particular: standalone, partly, and entirely embedded OIS/Vertical -- a. The concept of embedding as developed in Google Search (Shopping) -- b. Concept of embedding in Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Economic background: use of different access points for the same service -- aa) Relevance of access points to use a service -- bb) Different access points to use Google Search -- cc) Different access points to use Alphabet's OIS/Verticals -- dd) Conclusion: specialised results in OSE serve as access point to OIS/Vertical -- d. Clarification in the Commission's designation decision -- III. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service -- 1. Similar service -- 2. Service of a third party -- 3. Protection of each third party providing a similar service -- IV. Identifying a more favourable treatment -- 1. Background -- a. 15 years of Google Search (Shopping) proceeding clarified the abuse -- b. Competition law remedies failed.

c. Growing calls for structural remedies -- d. DMA's ban on self-preferencing as political compromise -- 2. Relevant treatment of services -- a. Differentiated treatment as relevant conduct -- b. Ranking -- aa) Definition: relative prominence -- bb) In 'search results' -- (1) Any information returned, including a service directly offered -- (2) In response to, and related to a search query -- (3) Including real-time interface adjustments -- cc) Results in any interface of any access point of the OSE -- c. Crawling and indexing -- d. Other treatments having an equivalent effect -- 3. More favourable treatment of First-Party Service -- a. Equal treatment vs no self-preferencing -- b. Conferral of advantage upon First-Party Service -- aa) Examples mentioned in recital (51) DMA -- (1) Better ranking of results leading to a service -- (2) Partial embedding of a service -- (3) Entire embedding of a service -- bb) Difference partial / entire embedding -- cc) Consequence: favouring does not require a service with a separate access point -- (1) Groups of results specialised in a certain topic -- (2) Considered or used by certain end users as a distinct service -- dd) Further examples of relevant advantages -- c. No equivalent for similar Third-Party Service -- aa) General framework -- bb) Equivalence of opportunity -- (1) Relevant opportunities relating to search prominence -- (2) Equivalence of prominence -- cc) No circumvention of ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Article 13(6) DMA -- (2) Dark patterns -- (3) Degradation of conditions or quality of the OSE -- dd) No remaining imbalance of rights and obligations -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 2 DMA: "fairness" of "such ranking" -- (2) Inability to fully capture benefits of own innovation and efforts -- (3) Inability to compete for the full service -- (4) Inability of all similar third parties to compete.

(5) Improper conditions for third parties -- (6) Improper pricing -- ee) No conferral of a disproportionate advantage upon the gatekeeper -- (1) Conferral of advantage upon OSE or other CPS -- (2) Relevant advantages -- (3) Disproportionality of the advantage conferred -- d. No discrimination of dissimilar services with similar websites, including of direct suppliers -- aa) Ranking concerns of dissimilar third parties -- bb) Technical framework: OSE's function to rank diverse websites, not business models -- (1) OSEs' side-by-side display of complementary services -- (2) Neutrality as competitive factor for OSEs -- cc) Economic framework: advantages for direct suppliers of a ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Harms of self-preferencing for direct suppliers -- (2) (No) disadvantages for direct suppliers from competition amongst indirect suppliers -- (3) Gatekeeper's incentives to turn direct suppliers against rival indirect suppliers -- dd) Legal framework -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 1 and sentence 2 DMA: relation for "non-discrimination" -- (2) Article 6(12) DMA and its relationship to Article 6(5) DMA -- (3) Subjective rights of dissimilar third parties -- ee) Consequences for compliance -- 4. Technical constraints, efficiency justifications and burden of compliance -- a. Framework: DMA compliance by design -- b. Gatekeeper needs to bear the costs of compliance with Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Constraints to achieve equal opportunities justify no self-preferencing -- d. Objective justification arguments raised in Google Search (Shopping) -- aa) Google's arguments regarding technical constraints -- bb) Rejection of objective justification by Commission and General Court -- d) No objective justification criterion in Article 6(5) DMA -- V. Consequences where no fair equivalent can be found -- C. Resulting principles for compliance with Article 6(5) DMA.

I. Safe harbour -- II. Individual assessment -- 1. Identifying a distinct service of a gatekeeper that shall not be favoured -- 2. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- 3. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- List of references -- Index.