Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : : industry concentration and corporate complication / / Scott Hempling.

• VerfasserIn: Hempling, Scott,
• Place / Publishing House: Cheltenham, England : : Edward Elgar Publishing,, 2020.
• Year of Publication: 2020
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (234 pages)

"What happens when electric utility monopolies pursue their acquisition interests--undisciplined by competition, and insufficiently disciplined by the regulators responsible for replicating competition? Since the mid-1980s, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities have halved the number of local, independent utilities. Mostly debt-financed, these transactions have converted retiree-suitable investments into subsidiaries of geographically scattered conglomerates. Written by one of the U.S.'s leading regulatory thinkers, this book combines legal, accounting, economic and financial analysis of the 30-year march of U.S. electricity mergers with insights from the dynamic field of behavioral economics."

Table of Contents

Part I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D.C. Public Service Commission.