Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : : industry concentration and corporate complication / / Scott Hempling.

• VerfasserIn: Hempling, Scott,
• TeilnehmendeR: Edward Elgar Publishing,
• Place / Publishing House: Northampton : : Edward Elgar Publishing,, 2020.
• Year of Publication: 2020
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (576 pages)
• Notes: Includes index.

"What happens when electric utility monopolies pursue their acquisition interests-undisciplined by competition, and insufficiently disciplined by the regulators responsible for replicating competition? Since the mid-1980s, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities have halved the number of local, independent utilities. Mostly debt-financed, these transactions have converted retiree-suitable investments into subsidiaries of geographically scattered conglomerates. Written by one of the U.S.'s leading regulatory thinkers-a litigating attorney, regulatory advisor, expert witness and law professor-this book combines legal, accounting, economic and financial analysis with insights from the dynamic field of behavioral economics. With a clear assessment of the 30-year march of U.S. electricity mergers, the author describes the economic losses that result when merger promoters and their transactions face neither the discipline of competition nor the rigors of regulation. This work is essential reading for regulatory practitioners, consumer advocates and investment advisors-as well as citizens concerned with concentration of economic power. The principles explored are relevant anywhere regulated utility monopolies have the legal right to merge, acquire or be acquired"-- Provided by publisher.

Table of Contents

Part I: The transactions: Sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended -- 1. Diverse strategies, common purpose: Selling public franchises for private gain -- 2. Missing from utility merger markets: Competitive discipline -- 3. The structural result: Concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms: Economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- 4. Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- 5. Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- 6. Mergers can distort competition: Market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- 7. Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses: Visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- 8. Regulators' unreadiness: Checklists instead of visions -- 9. Promoters' strategy: Frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- 10. How do regulators respond? By ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- 11. Explanations: Passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions: Regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- 12. Regulatory posture and practice: Less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- 13. Regulatory infrastructure: Strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- References -- Index.