Knowledge as a mental state? : : a study on Oxford realism / / Jens Kohne.
Long description: Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the ment...
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Place / Publishing House: | Berlin : : Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH,, [2010] ©2010 |
Year of Publication: | 2010 |
Language: | English |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (iv, 131 pages) |
Notes: | PublicationDate: 20100830 |
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Kohne, Jens, author. Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / Jens Kohne. Berlin : Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, [2010] ©2010 1 online resource (iv, 131 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 125-131). Description based on print version record. Long description: Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking -- a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called ``epistemic absolutism''. So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results -- notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis. PublicationDate: 20100830 Wilson, John Cook, 1849-1915. Prichard, H. A. (Harold Arthur), 1871-1947. Austin, J. L. (John Langshaw), 1911-1960. Knowledge, Theory of. Realism. 3-8325-2515-7 |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Kohne, Jens, |
spellingShingle |
Kohne, Jens, Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / |
author_facet |
Kohne, Jens, |
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j k jk |
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VerfasserIn |
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Kohne, Jens, |
title |
Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / |
title_sub |
a study on Oxford realism / |
title_full |
Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / Jens Kohne. |
title_fullStr |
Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / Jens Kohne. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / Jens Kohne. |
title_auth |
Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / |
title_new |
Knowledge as a mental state? : |
title_sort |
knowledge as a mental state? : a study on oxford realism / |
publisher |
Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, |
publishDate |
2010 |
physical |
1 online resource (iv, 131 pages) |
isbn |
3-8325-8986-4 3-8325-2515-7 |
callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-subject |
BD - Speculative Philosophy |
callnumber-label |
BD161 |
callnumber-sort |
BD 3161 K646 42010 |
era_facet |
1849-1915. 1871-1947. 1911-1960. |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-tens |
120 - Epistemology |
dewey-ones |
121 - Epistemology |
dewey-full |
121 |
dewey-sort |
3121 |
dewey-raw |
121 |
dewey-search |
121 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kohnejens knowledgeasamentalstateastudyonoxfordrealism |
status_str |
n |
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(CKB)4100000007747076 (MiAaPQ)EBC5722976 5c7aad74-41c0-4488-9792-7583b0dd2d03 (EXLCZ)994100000007747076 |
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Knowledge as a mental state? : a study on Oxford realism / |
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