The conflict over Kosovo : : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / / Stephen T. Hosmer.
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who direc...
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| Superior document: | Project Air Force series on Operation Allied Force |
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| TeilnehmendeR: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Santa Monica, Calif. : : Rand,, 2001. ©2001 |
| Year of Publication: | 2001 |
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Project Air Force series on Operation Allied Force.
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) :; illustrations, charts |
| Notes: | "Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited." |
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Table of Contents:
- Introduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observations