Operations against enemy leaders / Stephen T. Hosmer.

• Author: United States. Air Force.; Hosmer, Stephen T.
• TeilnehmendeR: United States. Air Force.; Rand Corporation.; Project Air Force (U.S.)
• Year of Publication: 2001
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (178 p.)
• Notes: "Prepared for the United States Air Force."; "Project Air Force."

An examination of a number of leadership attacks from World War II to the 21st century. It offers insights into the comparative efficacy of various forms of leadership attacks, their potential coercive and deterrent value, and the possible unintended consequences of their ill-considered use.

Table of Contents

• PREFACE; TABLE; SUMMARY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; ABBREVIATIONS; Chapter One INTRODUCTION; OBJECTIVES OF LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; STUDY APPROACH; SOURCES; ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT; Chapter Two ATTACKING LEADERS DIRECTLY; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DIRECT ATTACKS; CONSTRAINTS ON LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; SITUATIONS IN WHICH DIRECT ATTACKS ARE LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; ASSESSING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DIRECT ATTACKS; DIRECT ATTACKS RARELY PRODUCE WANTED POLICY CHANGES; DIRECT ATTACKS OFTEN FAIL TO DETER UNWANTED ENEMY BEHAVIOR; DIRECT ATTACKS CAN SOMETIMES PRODUCE HARMFUL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
• DIRECT ATTACKS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO NEUTRALIZE THEIR INTENDED TARGETSPREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY LEADERS; Chapter Three FACILITATING COUPS OR REBELLIONS; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SUPPORT TO COUPS OR REBELLIONS; A POOR SUCCESS RATE WITH COUPS AND REBELLIONS; SUPPORT OF REBELLION TO CHANGE HOSTILE POLICY; WHY U.S. ADVERSARIES HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO OVERTHROW AND INTIMIDATE; COERCIVE AND DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, AND REBELLIONS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO COUPS AND REBELLIONS; Chapter Four TAKING DOWN REGIMES WITH EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCE
• RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING CAPABILITIES TO TAKE DOWN ENEMY REGIMESPOTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON CONDUCTING TAKEDOWNS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; ENHANCING THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; Chapter Five CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS; REMOVING ENEMY LEADERS WILL BE NEITHER EASY NOR ALWAYS BENEFICIAL; WHEN LEADERSHIP ATTACKS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; PREREQUISITES OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AIR POWER IN DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, REBELLIONS, AND TAKEDOWNS; THE DETERRENT AND COERCIVE EFFECTS OF THREATS TO REMOVE LEADERS; BIBLIOGRAPHY