Analytic support to intelligence in counterinsurgencies / Walter L. Perry, John Gordon IV.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. They will most likely face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and pr...
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| Year of Publication: | 2008 |
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Language: | English |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (85 p.) |
| Notes: | "RAND National Defense Research Institute." |
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Table of Contents:
- Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Analysis; Conclusion; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE Introduction; The Focus on Conventional Operations; The Hard Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan; About This Monograph; CHAPTER TWO The Nature of Modern Insurgency; Proto-Insurgency; Small-Scale Insurgency; Large-Scale Insurgency; CHAPTER THREE The Dominance of Intelligence; Intelligence Operations in Support of Conventional Combat; Intelligence in Support of Counterinsurgencies; CHAPTER FOUR The Analytic Questions; The Proto-Insurgency; Small-Scale Insurgency
- Large-Scale Insurgency CHAPTER FIVE Intelligence Analysis; Data: Precision Versus Accuracy; Discerning Patterns; Predictive Tools; Analyzing Insurgent Networks: The "Counterinsurgency Common Operational Picture" (COINCOP); Enemy-Friendly Interaction Analyses; CHAPTER SIX Conclusions; Modern Insurgency; The Role of Analysis; Bibliography