Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak / Stephen T. Hosmer.
Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military...
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| Year of Publication: | 2007 |
| Language: | English |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (177 p.) |
| Notes: | Description based upon print version of record. |
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| Summary: | Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would h |
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| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (p. [145]-152). |
| ISBN: | 1281181021 9786611181024 0833042602 |
| Hierarchical level: | Monograph |
| Statement of Responsibility: | Stephen T. Hosmer. |