Law and Policy of IMF Conditionality / / Erik M. G. Denters.

• Superior document: Legal Aspects of International Organizations Series ; Volume 27
• VerfasserIn: Denters, Erik,
• Place / Publishing House: The Hague, The Netherlands : : KluwerLaw International,, [1996]; ©1996
• Year of Publication: 1996
• Edition: First edition.
• Language: English
• Series: Legal aspects of nursing practice ; Volume 27.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (310 pages)

This work focuses on legal implications and policy aspects and, more specifically, on the question of how far-reaching the requirement of `adequate safeguards' may be. Furthermore, the author demonstrates that conditionality is also affected by cooperative arrangements with other institutions, such as the World Bank and United Nations. A major conclusion is that there should be improvements in cooperation and in the monitoring of the application of Fund law on conditionality.

Table of Contents

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Foreword and acknowledgements -- Table of Contents -- Abbreviations -- I INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS -- 1. Balance of payments and reserves -- 2. The IMF as a pivot of balance of payments support -- 3. Statement of the problem -- 4. Summary -- 5. Conclusions -- II INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS -- 1. International monetary law -- 2. Role of international law -- 3. Doctrine -- 3.1 Publications of Joseph Gold -- 3.2 Historiography by Horsefield and Garritsen de Vries -- 4. Objectives and methods -- 4.1 Method 1: Article IV Consultations -- 4.2 Method 2: Balance of payments support under adequate safeguards -- 4.3 Asymmetrical surveillance over member States -- 5. Organs and competences -- 5.1 Board of Governors -- 5.1.1 Executive Board -- 5.1.2 Managing Director -- 5.2 Instruments and powers -- 5.3 Decision-making: sense of the meeting -- 6. Excursus: economic and monetary group consultation -- 7. Membership -- 7.1 Excursus: discrimination in the case of application for membership by the Soviet Union -- 8. Participation in the IMF: quota -- 8.1 Subscription -- 8.2 Voting Rights -- 8.3 Extent of balance of payments support -- 8.4 Share in SDR allocations -- 9. Financial transactions between the IMF and member countries -- 9.1 Income from the General Resources Account -- 9.2 Drawings on the General Resources Account: tranche policy -- 9.3 Special facilities within the General Resources Account -- 9.4 Facilities outside the General Resources Account -- 10. Conditionally attached to facilities -- 11. Supply and demand of resources -- 12. Reflections on the future of the IMF -- 12.1 Towards sustainable development -- 12.2 Monetary Union in the EU -- 12.3 The supremacy of the Fund -- 12.4 The ECU as an exchange arrangement -- 12.5 Transfer of powers in the monetary field.

12.6 Simultaneous consultation processes under IMF and EMU -- 12.6.1 IMF Article IV Consultation -- 12.6.2 Consultation process under the EMU -- 12.6.3 Conflicts in consultation procedures -- 12.7 Balance of payments concepts -- 12.7.1 Balance of payments as perceived by the Fund -- 12.7.2 Absence of balance of payments in EMU -- 12.7.3 Balance of payments support by the IMF -- 12.8 Participation in the IMF -- 12.9 Reconciling obligations under EMU and the IMF -- III EVOLUTION OF CONDITIONALITY -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Absence of unambiguous provisions: teleological approach -- 3. Editing of Art. V Sect. 3 -- 3.1 Joint Statement and Atlantic City -- 3.2 Bretton Woods conference -- 3.3 Parliamentary approval in the Netherlands -- 4. Institutional decision-making -- 4.1 Right to challenge established -- 5. European Recovery Plan -- 6. Grounds for judgement -- 6.1 Interpretation of Art. V Sect. 3: 'provisions of this Agreement' -- 6.1.1 Conditions laid down in provisions -- 6.1.2 Conditions deriving from the purposes -- 7. Interpretation of 'adequate safeguards' -- 7.1 Additional criteria -- 7.2 Temporary character -- 7.3 Decision of 1952 -- 8. Innovations -- 8.1 Stand-by arrangement -- 8.2 Additional understandings -- 8.3 Letter of intent -- 8.4 Differentiation according to tranches -- 8.5 Standard clauses -- 8.6 No contractual relation -- 9. Amendments -- IV CODIFICATION OF POLICY: GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Motivation for the guidelines -- 3. Force of law and non-discriminatory treatment -- 4. Evaluations -- 5. Elements of the guidelines -- 6. Letter of intent and stand-by arrangement -- 7. Initial phase and preconditions -- 8. Measures in adjustment programmes -- 8.1 Policy understandings -- 8.2 Performance criteria -- 8.2.1 Performance criteria: macro- and microeconomic variables.

8.2.2 Performance criteria versus preconditions -- 8.3 Consultation and phasing -- 8.4 Reviews and evaluation -- 9. The line between IMF authority and economic sovereignty -- 9.1 Ban on political interference -- 9.2 Due regard for social and political objectives, and economic priorities -- 10. Application of guidelines -- 11. SAF/ESAF loans -- 11.1 Applicability of guidelines -- 11.2 Contractual character -- 11.3 Procedure -- V REINTERPRETATION OF AIMS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Economic development as a purpose of the IMF -- 2.1 Opinions at the time of Bretton Woods -- 2.2 Economic growth as a primary aim -- 3. Shortcomings of adjustment programmes -- 3.1 Perception of the IMF -- 3.2 Perception of developing countries -- 4. Protection of productive investments as a performance criterion -- 5. Protection of socioeconomic standards -- 5.1 Instructions to IMF missions -- 6. Excessive defence expenditure -- 6.1 The criterion: overspending -- 6.2 Defence expenditure and adjustment programmes -- 7. Objections to performance criteria relating to protection of protective investments and income distribution -- 7.1 Eroding economic sovereignty -- 7.2 Objections of a practical nature -- 8. Necessity of cooperation -- 9. Excursus: sustainable development and debt -- 9.1 Excessive debt as an impediment to sustainable development -- 9.2 Creating favourable conditions -- 9.3 Improving the Fund's role in debt management -- VI CONDITIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Tensions arising from cooperation -- 3. Cooperation with the World Bank -- 3.1 Structural adjustment by the World Bank -- 3.2 Conditionality of World Bank balance of payments support -- 3.3 The PFP process -- 3.4 Memorandum for cooperation -- 3.5 Cross conditionality -- 4. Expansion of the PFP process -- 5. Cooperation with the WTO -- 6. Cooperation with the United Nations.

6.1 IMF-UN relations -- 6.2 Binding decisions of the Security Council -- 6.3 Recommendations of the General Assembly -- 7. Violation of civil and political rights -- 7.1 International credit and civil and political rights -- 7.2 Refusal of support as a sanction -- 8. Promotion of economic, social and cultural rights -- 8.1 Scope of obligation requiring a particular course of conduct -- 8.2 Treaty implementation ratione temporis -- 8.3 The US position -- 9. Monitoring implementation of the Economic Covenant -- 10. Model for cooperation -- VII INTERPRETATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Necessity of IMF interpretations -- 3. Law applying to interpretations -- 4. Interpretations in formal procedure -- 4.1 Features of the interpretation procedure -- 4.2 Appraisal of the procedure -- 4.3 Disagreements about the composition of the Committee on Interpretation -- 5. Interpretation of By-Laws: possible composition of the Committee -- 5.1 Possible interpretations in connection with conditionality -- 6. Interpretations outside Art. XXIX -- 7. Disagreements over conditionality -- Selected bibliography -- Appendices -- Articles of Agreement of the IMF -- Selected decisions on the use of the Fund's resources -- Index.