Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : : industry concentration and corporate complication / / Scott Hempling.
"What happens when electric utility monopolies pursue their acquisition interests--undisciplined by competition, and insufficiently disciplined by the regulators responsible for replicating competition? Since the mid-1980s, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities have halved the num...
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Place / Publishing House: | Cheltenham, England : : Edward Elgar Publishing,, 2020. |
Year of Publication: | 2020 |
Language: | English |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (234 pages) |
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Hempling, Scott, author. Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / Scott Hempling. Cheltenham, England : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020. 1 online resource (234 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Description based on: online resource; title from PDF information screen (Worldcat, viewed July 3, 2023). "What happens when electric utility monopolies pursue their acquisition interests--undisciplined by competition, and insufficiently disciplined by the regulators responsible for replicating competition? Since the mid-1980s, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities have halved the number of local, independent utilities. Mostly debt-financed, these transactions have converted retiree-suitable investments into subsidiaries of geographically scattered conglomerates. Written by one of the U.S.'s leading regulatory thinkers, this book combines legal, accounting, economic and financial analysis of the 30-year march of U.S. electricity mergers with insights from the dynamic field of behavioral economics." Part I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D.C. Public Service Commission. Electric utilities Law and legislation. |
language |
English |
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eBook |
author |
Hempling, Scott, |
spellingShingle |
Hempling, Scott, Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / Part I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D.C. Public Service Commission. |
author_facet |
Hempling, Scott, |
author_variant |
s h sh |
author_role |
VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Hempling, Scott, |
title |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / |
title_sub |
industry concentration and corporate complication / |
title_full |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / Scott Hempling. |
title_fullStr |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / Scott Hempling. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / Scott Hempling. |
title_auth |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / |
title_new |
Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : |
title_sort |
regulating mergers and acquisitions of u.s. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / |
publisher |
Edward Elgar Publishing, |
publishDate |
2020 |
physical |
1 online resource (234 pages) |
contents |
Part I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D.C. Public Service Commission. |
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K - Law |
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K - General Law |
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K3982 |
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K 43982 H467 42020 |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
340 - Law |
dewey-ones |
343 - Military, tax, trade & industrial law |
dewey-full |
343.0929 |
dewey-sort |
3343.0929 |
dewey-raw |
343.0929 |
dewey-search |
343.0929 |
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Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication / |
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