Space law in a networked world / / P. J. Blount and Mahulena Hofmann.

• Superior document: Studies in Space Law
• VerfasserIn: Blount, P. J.,; Hofmann, Mahulena,
• TeilnehmendeR: Hofmann, Mahulena,
• Place / Publishing House: Leiden ;, Boston : : Brill,, [2023]
• Year of Publication: 2023
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Studies in Space Law
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (296 pages)

"Access to space technology has changed dramatically in the past 10 years. Traditionally, access to space capabilities required dedicated receivers and significant investment. With the advent of new information technologies that incorporate and disseminate the benefits of space directly to users, access to space technology is no longer so exclusive"-- Provided by publisher.

Table of Contents

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- Figures and Tables -- Notes on Contributors -- Section I Cybersecurity for Space Assets -- Chapter 1 A Network of Governance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Governance -- 3 Cybersecurity Governance in Space -- 4 Developing the Governance Knowledge -- 5 Conclusion -- Chapter 2 New Space Architectures - Connectivity and Cyber Security -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Concepts and Definitions -- 1.1.1 Cyber Security -- 1.1.2 Cyber Security Risks -- 1.2 Selected Publicly Known Attacks -- 2 Threat Actors and Vectors -- 2.1 Threat Actors - Motivation, Capabilities and Impact -- 2.1.1 Organized Crime -- 2.1.2 Hacktivists and Cyber Terrorists -- 2.1.3 Nation State Threat Actors -- 2.2 Attack Vectors -- 2.2.1 Physical Attacks -- 2.2.2 Electronic / RF Attacks -- 2.2.3 Cyber Attacks -- 2.2.4 Phishing Attacks -- 2.3 Trending Attack Vectors -- 2.3.1 CEO Fraud -- 2.3.2 Ransomware Attacks -- 2.3.3 Supply Chain Attacks -- 2.4 Traditional Challenges ("Weaknesses") Are Driving Cyber Security Risks -- 2.4.1 Broad Use of Proprietary Systems -- 2.4.2 Long System Lifetimes -- 2.4.3 Conflicting Priorities -- 3 Evolution Brings New Challenges -- 3.1 Space Evolves as a Critical Infrastructure -- 3.2 Growing Complexity and Attack Surface of Infrastructures -- 3.3 Interdependencies in a Complex Eco-system -- 4 Conclusion -- Chapter 3 Cybersecurity Threats to Space: From Conception to the Aftermaths -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview of Cyber Geography -- 2.1 Space Mission Anatomy -- 2.1.1 Ground Segment -- 2.1.2 Space Segment -- 2.1.3 Orbits -- 2.2 Data, Links and Networks -- 2.2.1 Satellite Telecommunications -- 2.2.2 Networks -- 2.2.2.1 Classical Architecture -- 2.2.2.2 Co-location -- 2.2.2.3 Ground Station in the Cloud -- 2.2.2.4 Space Networks -- 3 Space Cyber Threats and Their Consequences.

3.1 Type of Operations -- 3.1.1 Electronic vs. Cyber Operations (Jamming/Spoofing/Hacking) -- 3.1.2 Systems and Infrastructure Disruptions, Unauthorized Data Collection, and Falsification: Stage of the Operations -- 3.2 Main Entry Points -- 3.3 Characterizing Space Cyber Threats -- 4 Protective Measures to Boost Cyber Resilience of Space Assets -- 4.1 Impact and Effects of Hostile Cyber Operations -- 4.1.1 Long-Term Consequences on the Activities, Relationships, and Environment -- 4.2 Reconstructing and Incident Response -- 4.3 ICT Governance Strategies -- 4.3.1 Context -- 4.3.2 ICT Governance Frameworks -- 4.3.3 US Approach to IT Governance in Space -- 4.3.4 Benefits of ICT Governance for Space -- 4.4 Technical Strategies -- 4.4.1 Software Assurance Methods -- 4.4.2 Software and Firmware Integrity Protections -- 4.4.3 SIEM s for Logging Onboard Events and Identification and Prevention Systems -- 4.4.4 Cryptographic Solutions and Crypto-agility -- 5 Application and Enforcement of the Law -- 5.1 The Context of Hostile Cyber Operations in International Law -- 5.1.1 Legal Responses to Cyber Issues -- 5.1.2 Legal and Political Responses in State-to-State Cyber Relations -- 5.2 Source of Hostile Cyber Operations -- 5.2.1 Techniques of Attribution: Localization and Identification -- 5.2.2 Responsibility of State Actors and Non-state Actors: The Question of the Positive Obligations -- 5.3 Collateral Victims -- 6 Private International Law Aftermath of the Hostile Cyber Operation -- 6.1 Contract Terms and Cross Waivers -- 6.2 International Commercial Arbitration -- 6.3 Prescriptive Jurisdiction vs Long-Arm Jurisdiction -- 6.4 Space and Cyber Insurance -- 6.4.1 Liability Convention and Insurance -- 6.4.2 Minimum Requirements for Risk Mitigations (the Notion of Prudent and Reasonable Actor): Insurance Aspects -- 7 Conclusion.

Chapter 4 Space Technology and Cybersecurity: Challenges and Technical Approaches for the Regulation of Large Constellations -- 1 Introductory Remarks -- 2 Growing Dependency on and Vulnerability of Outer Space Technology: Two Sides of the Same Coin -- 2.1 The Role of Digitalisation in the Space Industry -- 2.2 Dependence on Internet Accessibility in Outer Space and on Earth -- 2.3 Overview of the Cyber-Related Vulnerabilities of Satellite Systems -- 3 Cybersecurity of Small Satellites: A Case for Special Treatment or Business as Usual? -- 3.1 The Small Satellite Industry and the Big Picture -- 3.2 Current Trends in the Small Satellite Industry -- 3.3 Cyber-Related Vulnerabilities of Small Satellites and Large Constellations -- 3.3.1 Vulnerabilities of Small Satellites in General -- 3.3.2 Vulnerabilities of Large Constellations -- 3.4 The Relevance of Cybersecurity in the Small Satellite Industry -- 4 Means to Counteract Cyber-Related Vulnerabilities of Small Satellites and Large Constellations -- 4.1 Technical Measures -- 4.2 Management Measures -- 4.3 Legal and Regulatory Measures -- 4.4 Recent Regulatory Efforts in the United States -- 4.5 "Honeypots": A Solution for Large Constellations? -- 5 The Way Forward -- Section II Connectivity and Accessiblity -- Chapter 5 Disruptions of Satellite Communication: Comparing Cyber Attacks and Harmful Interference for the Purposes of Legal Regulation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Problem of Definitions and Understanding the Definitions -- 3 Harmful Interference -- 4 Cyber Attacks -- 5 Is Electromagnetic Interference a Cyber Attack? -- 6 The ITU, Harmful Interference and Cybersecurity -- 7 Conclusion -- Chapter 6 Non-Geostationary Satellite Systems: New Rules of Bringing Them into Use and Phasing Their Deployment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The BIU and BBIU Procedures -- 3 Requirements for BIU and BBIU.

4 Core of the Problem -- 5 Historical Background -- 6 ITU Recognizes the Problem -- 7 Preliminary Conclusions and Proposals -- 8 New Regulation Adopted by the WRC-19 -- 8.1 BIU (BBIU) a Frequency Assignment to Non-GSO Systems -- 8.2 Implementation of Non-GSO Systems -- 8.3 Three Phases of Deploying Non-GSO Systems -- 8.4 Modifications to the Characteristics of a Frequency Assignment as Penalty for Failure to Meet the Requirements for the Phased Deployment -- 8.5 Exception to the General Rule on the Modifications to the Characteristics for Failure to Meet the Requirements for a Phased Deployment -- 8.6 Satellite Hopping Is Still out of Favour -- 9 Conclusion -- Chapter 7 Software Certification as a Limit on Liability: The Case of CubeSat Operations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background: Connecting Software Engineering with Fault and Collision Liability -- 2.1 Current Trends: Increase Risk of Conjunctions -- 2.2 The Liability for Space Activities: A Primer -- 2.3 On the Relationship between Fault, RTOS, and Software Certification -- 3 Empirical Evaluation of the Quality of CubeSat Real-Time Operating Systems -- 3.1 Size of the Codebase -- 3.2 Halstead and Cyclomatic Complexity -- 3.3 Keywords: Goto, Inline, etc. -- 4 Legal Implications for Launching States -- 5 Strategies for Mitigating Liability -- 6 Conclusion -- Section III Data Processing -- Chapter 8 Law and Policy of Data from Space: Satellite Navigation and Remote Sensing -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Future of Space Technologies: Integration and Fusion -- 1.2 From Technological Trends to Legal Definitions -- 2 Legal Challenges for the Public Sector -- 2.1 The Public Sector as a User -- 2.2 The Public Sector as a System Operator/Service Provider -- 2.3 Public Sector Support to Downstream Market Uptake -- 2.4 Stable and Clear Legal Framework -- 3 Data and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy.

3.1 General Considerations and Upstream Space Sector -- 3.2 Downstream Space Sector and Space Related Services -- 4 Optimising the Application of the Regulatory Framework -- 4.1 Interoperability - Standardisation -- 4.2 (Cyber)security -- 4.3 Downstream Regulation -- 5 Liability -- 6 Data Protection -- 7 Conclusions -- Chapter 9 Space in Clouds and Clouds in Space - Dealing with Massive Amounts of EO Data -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Implementation of EO Cloud Computing Platforms -- 3 Legal Issues in Relation to EO Data in Clouds -- 3.1 Security -- 3.2 Privacy of Data -- 3.3 Ownership -- 4 Legal Issues in Relation to Clouds in Space -- 4.1 Ownership Rights in the Cloud Infrastructure -- 4.2 Ownership Rights in Data Stored or Generated in Clouds in Space -- 4.3 Location of the Cloud in Terms of Data Protection Law -- 5 Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 10 EU Data Protection Considerations for the Space Sector -- 1 Introduction -- 2 International Space Law and Privacy -- 3 The Space Sector and the GDPR -- 3.1 Definition of Personal Data -- 3.1.1 Content -- 3.1.2 Purpose -- 3.1.3 Result -- 3.2 Territorial Scope of the GDPR -- 3.2.1 Entity within the European Union -- 3.2.2 Entity outside of the European Union -- 3.2.3 Public International Law -- 4 The Space Sector and Data Protection Law within EU Institutions and International Organisations -- 4.1 EU Institutions -- 4.2 International Organisations -- 5 The Space Sector and Data Protection Law within EU Defence and Security -- 5.1 Public Security -- 5.2 National Security -- 6 Conclusion -- Chapter 11 The Regulation of the 'Open Data' Policy and Its Elements: The Legal Perspective of the EU Copernicus Programme -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Convergent Elements of Openness in the EO Data -- 2.1 'Open' Pillar -- 2.1.1 First Level: Essential Elements in Law -- 2.1.1.1 Ownership -- 2.1.1.2 Access to All.

2.1.1.3 Dissemination Platforms.