First-person thought : : action, identification and experience /

First-person thought : : action, identification and experience / / Maik Niemeck.

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Bibliographic Details
VerfasserIn:
Niemeck, Maik,
Place / Publishing House:Paderborn, Germany : : Brill Mentis,, [2022]
©2022
Year of Publication:2022
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Physical Description:1 online resource (242 pages)
Notes:Includes index.
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Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Content
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought?
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them
  • 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM)
  • 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis
  • 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model
  • 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action
  • 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought
  • 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought
  • 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought
  • 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech
  • 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum?
  • Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick?
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots
  • 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern?
  • 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component
  • 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern
  • 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself?
  • 2.7 Some Empirical Support
  • 2.8 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Getting IEM right
  • 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification
  • 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification
  • 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types?
  • 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens?
  • 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens
  • 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition?
  • 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence
  • 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession
  • 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification.
  • 3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility
  • 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM?
  • 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought
  • 3.8 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification
  • 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw?
  • 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument
  • 4.4.1 The Scope Problem
  • 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs?
  • 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries?
  • 4.5.1 The Scope Problem
  • 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem
  • 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception
  • Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I'
  • 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I'
  • 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections
  • 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation
  • 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness
  • 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections
  • 5.5 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience?
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Self-Representationalism
  • 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism
  • 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character
  • 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content?
  • 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves?
  • 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are?
  • 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between?
  • 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism
  • 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness
  • 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness
  • 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience.
  • 6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing
  • 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes?
  • 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes?
  • 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode
  • 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations
  • 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account
  • 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections
  • Chapter 7. Conclusions
  • Literature
  • Index.

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