Intentional Horizons : : The Mind from an Epistemic Point of View.

• Superior document: Mind Knowledge Communication
• Author: Jackson, Magdalena Balcerak.
• Place / Publishing House: Boston : : BRILL,, 2020.; ©2009.
• Year of Publication: 2020
• Language: German
• Series: Mind Knowledge Communication
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (199 pages)

Table of Contents

Intro -- Intentional Horizons: The Mind from an Epistemic Point of View -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY -- 1.1 Pandemonium within Philosophy of Mind -- 1.2 A Brief History of the Intentionality Debate -- 1.3 Intuitions and the Basic Features of Mental Acts -- 1.4 The Intentionalist Challenge: Between Phenomenological Adequacy and Explanatory Force -- 2. VARIETIES OF INTENTIONALISM -- 2.1 The Virtues and Vices of Definitions, Taxonomies and Classifications -- 2.2 A Critical Discussion of Representative Theories -- 2.2.1 Representationalism: Michael Tye's PANIC-Theory -- 2.2.2 Classical Intentionalism: Tim Crane's Perceptual Theory -- 2.2.3 Complementarism:Charles Siewert'sAnalyses -- 2.3 New Directions -- 3. ROOTS AND METHODOLOGY -- 3.1 A Superficial Dilemma -- 3.2 Roots: Frege and Husserl -- 3.2.1 Frege's Intensional Semantics -- 3.2.2 Husserl's Theory of Intentionality -- 3.3 Methodology: Phenomenological Reduction and Conceptual Analysis -- 3.3.1 A Reconstruction of Husserlian Methodology -- 3.3.2 AParadigmatic Model of AnalyticReasoning -- 3.3.3 The Suspension of Reference Strategy -- 4. AN EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT FOR INTENTIONALISM -- 4.1 Alex Byrne's Argument for Intentionalism -- 4.2 The Argument From Epistemic Significance -- 5. TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS AND PHENOMENAL CONTENT -- 5.1 The Two-Dimensionalist Background -- 5.1.1 The Foundations of the Two-Dimensional Modal Framework -- 5.1.2 DavidChalmers' Epistemic Intensions -- 5.1.3 Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism for the Contents of Thoughts -- 5.2 Phenomenal Content -- 5.2.1 What Is PhenomenalContent? -- 5.2.2 From Epistemic Intensions to Phenomenal Contents -- 5.2.3 The ExplanatoryRole of PhenomenalContent -- 5.3 Varieties of Intentionalism, Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Explanatory Force.

6. INTENTIONAL HORIZONS AND COGNITIVE DYNAMICS -- 6.1 The Test for Phenomenological Adequacy -- 6.2 Introducing Intentional Horizons -- 6.2.1 The Idea of Horizon Intentionality inHusserl -- 6.2.2 IntentionalHorizons for Epistemic Intensions -- 6.3 The Application of Intentional Horizons -- 6.3.1 Cognitively Significant A Priori Reasoning -- 6.3.2 TheRich Phenomenology of Perception -- 6.4 Cognitive Dynamics: Mental Acts Beyond Two-Dimensionalism -- REFERENCES -- INDEX.