Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox / Martin Pleitz
The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentenc...
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| Year of Publication: | 2018 |
| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Language: | English German |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource. |
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Table of Contents:
- Preliminary Material
- The Liar and Its Kind
- Informal Logic and the Liar Reasoning
- Formal Logic and Tarski’s Legacy
- Meaning, Semantics, and Reductionism
- Singular Terms and the Spectrum of Liar Sentences
- Is There a Gödelian Liar Sentence?
- How Can the Liar Paradox be Solved?
- The Changing World of Expressions
- Language in a Changing World
- Changeable Truth in Language and World
- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World I: Subsequentist Metaphysics
- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World II: Subsequentist Semantics
- Subsequentism Solves the Liar Paradox
- Literature.