Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought : : From Augustine to Buridan.

This volume examines the medieval understanding of Aristotle's "weakness of the will" (akrasia, incontinentia). The medieval views are outlined on the basis of five major commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics between 1250 and 1350.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Studien und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters Series ; v.44
:
Place / Publishing House:Boston : : BRILL,, 1994.
©1994.
Year of Publication:1994
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Studien und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters Series
Physical Description:1 online resource (216 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. The Aim of the Study
  • 1.2. Some Historical Remarks in Modern Discussion
  • 1.3. Aristotle on akrasia
  • 1.4. Some Heuristic Models
  • 2. Reluctant Actions in the Augustinian Tradition
  • 2.1. Augustine
  • 2.1.1. Free Will: Introductory Remarks
  • 2.1.2. Man's Inner Conflict
  • 2.1.3. Consent, Reluctant Actions and Choice
  • 2.1.4. Preferential Volitions and Latent Wishes
  • 2.1.5. Evil, Concupiscence and Continence
  • 2.2. Anselm of Canterbury
  • 2.2.1. The Human Freedom: Some Basic Ideas
  • 2.2.2. "Everyone Who Wills, Wills Willingly"
  • 2.2.3. Modes of Willing
  • Relation to Augustine
  • 2.3. Peter Abelard
  • 2.3.1. Consent Without Will
  • 2.3.2. Consent as passio
  • 2.3.3. Willing the Consequences
  • 2.3.4. Later Writers on Involuntary Consent
  • 2.4. Peter of Poitiers
  • 2.4.1. The Augustinian Tradition in Lombard's Sentences
  • 2.4.2. Synteresis and Voluntarism
  • 2.4.3. Second-order Will and vellem
  • 2.4.4. Asking something "With a Condition" (Poitiers and Langton)
  • 2.4.5. Willing the Consequences
  • 2.5. Some Early Thirteenth Century Summae
  • 2.5.1. William of Auxerre on velleitas
  • 2.5.2. The Summa Halensis on Conditional Will
  • 2.5.3. Philip Chancellor on Incomplete Will
  • 2.6. Conclusion
  • 3. Akrasia in Scholasticism
  • 3.1. Grosseteste, the Greek Commentator and Averroes
  • 3.2. Albert the Great
  • 3.2.1. Introductory Notes
  • 3.2.2. Choice and Free Decision
  • 3.2.3. The Ignorance of the Wicked Man
  • 3.2.4. Akrasia and the Certainty of Moral Knowledge
  • 3.2.5. Acting against Knowledge
  • 3.3. Thomas Aquinas
  • 3.3.1. Akrasia in the Commentary on Ethics
  • 3.3.2. Akrasia in De malo and Summa theologiae
  • 3.3.3. A Two-Step Explanation of akrasia
  • 3.3.4. Willing the Consequences and velleitas
  • 3.4. Walter Burley.
  • 3.4.1. Akrasia as Ignorance of the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogism
  • 3.4.2. Akrasia and Choice
  • 3.5. Gerald Odonis
  • 3.5.1. The Franciscan Context
  • 3.5.2. Akrasia as a Voluntary Vice (EN III)
  • 3.5.3. Akrasia in EN VII
  • 3.5.4. Open Problems
  • Relation to Earlier Commentators
  • 3.6. John Buridan
  • 3.6.1. Introductory Remarks
  • 3.6.2. Buridan's Action Theory in Book III q1-5
  • 3.6.3. Akrasia in Book VII
  • 3.6.4. Akrasia and Choice
  • 3.6.5. Akrasia and Uncertainty
  • Relation to Albert
  • 3.7. Conclusion
  • Sources and Literature
  • Index of Names
  • Index of Subjects
  • STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS.