Blurred : : selves made and selves making / / Andrew Oberg.

• VerfasserIn: Oberg, Andrew,
• Place / Publishing House: Leiden, Netherlands ;, London, England : : Brill-Rodopi,, [2020]; ©2020
• Year of Publication: 2020
• Language: English
• Series: Value Inquiry Book Series ; 357.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource.

The question of the self, of what the self is (or even if there is a self), has been one that has grown alongside humanity - has haunted humanity - throughout our history. Blurred: Selves Made and Selves Making guides the reader down these dark corridors, shining light on the specters of theories past and unveiling a new self-view to hover afresh, beckoning to roadways beyond. In this remarkably interdisciplinary study, philosophy of mind joins with contemporary neuroscience and cutting-edge psychology to lay bare the how of identity formation, judgment, and behavior generation. Drawing on thinkers from both the Continental and Analytic traditions, consciousness is explored and a uniquely realist self-concept presented that, if adopted, offers a life lived otherwise.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements -- 1 Background and Literature Review: four Representative Accounts -- 1.1 A Path Through the Thicket -- 1.2 Four Accounts of the Self -- 1.2.1 The Soft Anti-realist Position -- 1.2.2 The Hard Anti-realist Position -- 1.2.3 The Soft Realist Position -- 1.2.4 The Contextualized Soft Realist Position -- 1.3 Answers? - Guiding Questions -- 2 Laying the Groundwork: psychological and Embedded Factors, Proposing an Alternate Soft Realist Self Theory -- 2.1 Situating -- 2.2 Psychological Issues and the Self -- 2.2.1 Cognitive Structure -- 2.2.2 Going Back to Kristjánsson's Sets -- 2.2.3 Going Back to Hume -- 2.2.4 Selves, Personal Identity, and Whole Persons -- 2.2.5 Intuitions and Emotions -- 2.3 Bodily and Embodied Issues -- 2.4 A Word on Consciousness and Category Mistakes -- 2.5 Certain Uncertainty, Randomness, and Limited Choice -- 2.6 Taking Less (but taking) -- 3 Phenomenological Approaches to the Self: objections, replies, and 0bjections -- 3.1 Review and Preview -- 3.2 A General Objection and Reply -- 3.3 Phenomenologically based Accounts and Related Issues -- 3.3.1 Phenomenology 1: strawson's Thin Self/minimal Subject -- 3.3.2 Phenomenology 2: dainton's Phenomenal Self -- 3.3.3 Phenomenology 3: going Back to Husserl -- 3.3.4 Phenomenology 4: heidegger on the Self -- 3.4 Concluding Introduction -- 4 Galen Strawson's Panpsychism, Subjecthood, and the Self -- 4.1 A Starting Point -- 4.2 Panpsychism and Subjecthood -- 4.2.1 Strawson's Total Physicalism -- 4.2.2 Responses to Strawson and Related Panpsychist Concerns -- 4.3 Seductive, but only a Shimmering -- 5 Consciousness, Qualia, and the Self -- 5.1 Modern Neuroscience and the Structure of Consciousness -- 5.1.1 Consciousness, Intent, Thinking: definitions -- 5.1.2 The Gap, the Hard Problem, the Neuronal to Experience Straits: navigating -- 5.1.3 An Aside: always Conscious? -- 5.2 Qualia and the Self -- 5.2.1 'What it is Like' -- 5.2.2 Artificial Intelligence and the Self: the Importance of Qualia -- 5.2.3 Software, Hardware, and Wondering about the Real -- 5.3 A Query at Arrival -- 6 Metaphysics and Time: the Reality of a realist self and its (re-)making -- 6.1 Metaphysics for a Realist Self -- 6.2 Time, the Made Self, and the Making Self -- 6.3 Exhausted Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.