Fool me twice : : intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism / / Thomas E. Copeland.
This study evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – c...
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| Year of Publication: | 2007 |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Nijhoff eBook titles 2007
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (318 p.) |
| Notes: | Description based upon print version of record. |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Copeland, Thomas E. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Fool me twice : |b intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism / |c Thomas E. Copeland. |
| 260 | |a Leiden ; |a Boston : |b Martinus Nijhoff, |c c2007. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (318 p.) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a Nijhoff eBook titles 2007 | |
| 500 | |a Description based upon print version of record. | ||
| 546 | |a English | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |t Preliminary Material / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 1. Introduction / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 2. February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 3. April; 19, 1995: Oklahoma City / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 4. June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 5. August 7, 1998: U.S. Embassies In Kenya And Tanzania / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 6. September 11,2001: The Twin Towers / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Chapter 7. Surprise, Again And Again / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Appendix . Government-Imposed Restrictions On Fbi Domestic Terrorism Investigations / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Bibliography / |r T.E. Copeland -- |t Index / |r T.E. Copeland. |
| 520 | |a This study evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. The study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. The study has implications for intelligence reform, information sharing, congressional oversight, and society’s expectations about the degree to which the intelligence community can predict or prevent surprise attacks. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-288) and index. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Intelligence service |z United States |x Evaluation. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Terrorism |x Prevention. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Bombings. | |
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