Willensstruktur und Handlungsorganisation in Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit / / von Saša Josifović.

• Superior document: Critical studies in German idealism, volume 11
• VerfasserIn: Josifovic, Sasa,
• Place / Publishing House: Boston : : Brill,, [2014]; ©2014
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Language: German
• Series: Critical studies in German idealism ; volume 11.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (414 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.
• Other title: Preliminary Material /; 1 Einleitung /; 2 Freiheitskonzepte in Kants Philosophie /; 3 Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft /; 4 Die Theorie des höchsten Guts in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Vom letzten Zweck des Gebrauches unserer Vernunft /; 5 Übergang zur praktischen Freiheit in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Von der freien Willkür zum freien Willen /; 6 Die Antinomie der spekulativen und praktischen Vernunft /; 7 Die Postulatenlehre /; 8 Schluss /; 9 Literaturverzeichnis /; Namensregister /; Stichwortverzeichnis /
• Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• ISBN: 9004271724
• ISSN: 1878-9986
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: von Saša Josifović.

Kant’s theory of practical freedom represents a masterpiece of the philosophical inquiry into self-constitution, self-government, and volitional self-determination. It includes a sophisticated theory of action intrinsically determined by a specific concept of control over the processes that determine the contents of volition as well as those which facilitate the realization of ends. The most distinctive feature of this theory of action consists of the specific function of autonomously generated principles which, according to Kant, facilitate control over the process of volitional self-determination and thus constitute agency. Willensstruktur und Handlungsorganisation in Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit provides a detailed reconstruction of Kant’s theory of practical freedom and action as rationally guided volitional self-determination in his first and second \'Critique\'.