The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / / [by] Masaaki Higashijima.
Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in au...
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Superior document: | Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies |
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Place / Publishing House: | Ann Arbor, Michigan : : University of Michigan Press,, [2022] ©2022 |
Year of Publication: | 2022 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (367 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Part I. Puzzles and arguments
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections
- Part II. Cross-national explorations
- Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud
- Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation
- Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering
- Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
- Part III. Comparative case studies
- Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
- Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
- Chapter 9. Conclusion.