Table of Contents: Populist challenges to constitutional interpretation in Europe and beyond /

Populist challenges to constitutional interpretation in Europe and beyond / / edited by Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Zoltán Szente.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:	Comparative Constitutional Change Ser.
TeilnehmendeR:	Gárdos-Orosz, Fruzsina, Szente, Zoltán,
Place / Publishing House:	London ;, New York, New York : : Routledge,, [2021] ©2021
Year of Publication:	2021
Language:	English
Series:	Comparative Constitutional Change Ser.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (xvi, 329 pages)
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Table of Contents:

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Authors
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I: Theoretical implications
Chapter 1: Populism and populist constitutionalism
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The impalpable concept of populism
1.3 Conceptualizing populism
1.3.1 Historical background
1.3.2 The dimensions of populism
1.3.3 Types of populism
1.4 The mysterious notion of populist constitutionalism
1.4.1 'Authoritarian', 'illiberal', or 'populist' constitutionalism?
1.4.2 Populist constitutionalism: an oxymoron, or a special kind of constitutional system?
1.4.3 Defining populist constitutionalism: positive and negative criteria
1.4.3.1 Negative criteria of populist constitutionalism
1.4.3.1.1 Criticism of the separation of law and politics
1.4.3.1.2 Anti-elitism
1.4.3.1.3 Anti-institutionalism
1.4.3.1.4 Anti-pluralism
1.4.3.1.5 Illiberalism
1.4.3.2 Positive criteria of populist constitutionalism
1.4.3.2.1 Popular sovereignty and direct democracy
1.4.3.2.2 Authentic popular representation
1.4.3.2.3 Extreme majoritarianism
1.4.3.2.4 The strong leader (personification of power) and the strengthening of executive power
1.4.3.2.5 The instrumentalization of law
1.4.3.2.6 Other (secondary) criteria
Chapter 2: The art of constitutional interpretation
2.1 Defining constitutional interpretation
2.2 Classifying interpretive theories
2.2.1 Monist and pluralistic theories
2.2.2 Other classifications of interpretive theories
2.3 Main interpretive theories
2.3.1 Interpretive modalities
2.3.2 Substantive interpretation
2.3.3 Other interpretive aids: judicial doctrines, constructions, standards, tests and legal maxims
2.4 Conclusion.
Chapter 3: An 'Instrument of Government' or 'Instrument of Courts'?: The impact of political systems on constitutional interpretation and the case of populism
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Do political systems generate their own rules of constitutional interpretation?
3.2.1 Hypotheses
3.2.2 Written rules on constitutional interpretation - in the liberal world and beyond
3.3 Populist constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation - instruments and limits
3.4 Escalating or de-escalating populism: the role of courts in constitutional interpretation
3.5 Conclusions
Chapter 4: Can there be autochthonous methods of constitutional interpretation?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Substantive constitutional provisions
4.3 Interpretations of substantive provisions
4.4 Methods of constitutional interpretation
4.5 Conclusion
Part II: Constitutional interpretation and populism in Europe
Chapter 5: Formalism and judicial self-restraint as tools against populism?: Considerations regarding recent developments of the Austrian Constitutional Court
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Populism in Austria
5.2.1 Populism - what kind of populism?
5.2.2 The Austrian Freedom Party and the rise of populism in Austria
5.2.2.1 Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party (1986-2000)
5.2.2.2 The European scandal: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part I (2000-2006)
5.2.3 Recent development: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part II (2017-2019)
5.3 The Kurz Governments
5.3.1 Kurz I (2017-2019)
5.3.2 Kurz II (2020-)
5.4 Changing approaches of the Austrian Constitutional Court
5.4.1 Judicial approaches towards populism
5.4.2 Promoting Rights in a European Context (1970-2008)
5.4.3 The Slovenian Minority Case Law
5.4.4 Protecting Rights in a European Context (2008-2020)
5.4.5 Surveillance Case Law.
5.5 Conclusion - The Austrian Constitutional Court maintains its own approach
Chapter 6: The Czech Constitutional Court in times of populism: From judicial activism to judicial self-restraint
6.1 The legal design of the Czech Constitutional Court and the rise of populism in Czech politics
6.2 The two decades of expansion of the powers of the Constitutional Court and the decade of slow retreat
6.3 Review of the constitutionality of legislation
6.4 Activism of the Constitutional Court in relation to the general judiciary (constitutional complaints)
6.5 The personal homogeneity of the first Constitutional Court and the heterogeneity of the second and third court?
6.6 Conclusions
Chapter 7: Popular initiatives, populism and the Croatian Constitutional Court
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Popular initiative as the means of fostering populist claims
7.3 The game becomes serious: the introduction of the constitutional identity concept
7.4 Proportionality in action
7.5 Back to the linguistic approach
7.6 Systemic interpretation in play
7.7 The story continues: recent failed attempts
7.8 Conclusion
Chapter 8: Constitutional identity as a populist notion?: The Council of State and the forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis
8.1 Introduction
8.2 The forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis
8.3 Understanding the Court's use of the notion of constitutional identity
8.4 Lessons to be drawn from the Greek experience
8.5 Epilogue
Chapter 9: Constitutional interpretation under the new Fundamental Law of Hungary
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The new methods of constitutional interpretation
9.2.1 The Constitutional Court
9.2.2 The collection of the principles and methods of constitutional interpretation laid down in the Fundamental Law.
9.3 A new populist set of the methods of interpretation, or the reformulation of the classical methods?
9.4 The use of binding interpretative methods in constitutional jurisprudence
9.4.1 The application of the new methods of interpretation
9.4.2 Cases advancing populist constitutionalism (favouring the populist agenda) and the use of the new methods of interpretation in these specific cases
9.5 Conclusions
Chapter 10: The populist reforms in Italy and the instrument of the constitutionally conforming interpretation
10.1 Could the Italian context be defined as populist?
10.2 The so-called ' decreti sicurezza ' and the containment of illegal migrants
10.3 The application of the constitutionally conforming interpretation
10.4 The (missing) intervention of the Constitutional Court on the Security Decrees
10.5 Conclusions
Chapter 11: Whatever works: Constitutional interpretation in Poland in times of populism
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Preliminaries
11.3 Change or continuity?
11.3.1 The limits of judicial power
11.3.2 The preferred methods of constitutional interpretation
11.3.3 The approach to earlier findings
11.3.4 The approach to international law and EU law
11.4 Why cherry picking?
11.4.1 Pragmatism
11.4.2 Ideology
11.4.3 Reputation
11.4.4 Rhetoric
11.5 Conclusions
Chapter 12: Non sequiturs in constitutional adjudication: Populism or epistemic deficit?
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Romania's political landscape: populist or not?
12.3 Discourses of constitutionalism in the Romanian context
12.4 Interpreting the Constitution
12.4.1 Decision no. 358/2018 - a problematic constitutional intervention
12.4.1.1 The political background
12.4.1.2 The legal background
12.4.1.3 A formalist result
12.4.2 Other constitutional 'mischiefs'.
12.5 Populism or epistemic deficit?
12.6 Conclusions
Chapter 13: Constitutional interpretation and populism in contemporary Spain
13.1 Introduction
13.2 The political and social context of Spain
13.3 Populist challenges to constitutional jurisprudence
13.4 The health crisis and the constitutional interpretation
13.5 Conclusions
Chapter 14: Populism, UK sovereignty, the rule of law and Brexit
14.1 Introduction
14.2 The Brexit referendum and populist politics
14.3 Brexit: parliamentary procedure and constitutional conventions
14.4 Brexit and the Courts
14.5 The interpretation of prerogative powers: Miller 1 - can the government trigger Article 50 by making use of prerogative powers?
14.6 Prerogative powers: Miller 2 - can the courts review the exercise of the prerogative to prorogue Parliament?
14.7 Has Brexit resulted in new constitutional theories or doctrines?
14.8 Conclusions
Part III: An outlook
Chapter 15: Born populist: The Trump administration, the courts and the Constitution of the United States
15.1 Introduction
15.2 The populist jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia
15.3 Originalism and American right-wing populism
15.4 Judicial populism before (and a bit after) the rise of right-wing populism
15.5 Populist pasts and presents
Chapter 16: Constitutional interpretation: What can Europeans learn from US debates?
16.1 Introduction
16.2 What is a constitution?
16.3 The limits of interpretability
16.4 Methods of interpretation
16.5 Imitative constitutionalism
16.6 Conclusion
Chapter 17: Populist and non-democratic reading of the Constitution: Sad lessons from Latin America
17.1 Foreword
17.2 Thesis and main inferences
17.3 Analysis
17.3.1 Brief methodological remarks
17.3.2 Starting points
17.3.3 What kind of foundations?.
17.3.4 Which rights are meant to be constitutional rights?.

Populist challenges to constitutional interpretation in Europe and beyond / / edited by Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Zoltán Szente.

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