A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation / / Debraj Ray.

• Superior document: The Lipsey lectures
• Author: Ray, Debraj.
• Year of Publication: 2007
• Language: English
• Series: Lipsey lectures.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (336 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Table of Contents

• Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; Part 1 The Setting; Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games; 2.3 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation; 2.4 Farsightedness; 2.5 Two Examples; 2.6 Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?; Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation; 3.1 Definitions and Notation; 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium; 3.3 Partition Functions; 3.4 Extensions; 3.5 Summary; Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation; Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 A Model
• 4.3 Equilibrium4.4 Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining; 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining; 4.6 Summary; Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games; 5.1 Symmetric Partition Functions; 5.2 An Algorithm; 5.3 Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria; 5.4 A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs; 5.5 Proofs; 5.6 Summary; Chapter 6. Applications; 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly; 6.2 Public Goods; 6.3 Proofs; 6.4 Summary; Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case; 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core; 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors; 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium
• 7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure7.5 More on Efficiency; 7.6 Externalities Revisited; 7.7 Alternative Protocols; 7.8 Proofs; 7.9 Summary; Chapter 8. A Framework for Reversible Agreements; 8.1 An Example; 8.2 A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation; 8.3 Binding Agreements; 8.4 Strategies and Equilibrium; 8.5 Absorption and Efficiency; 8.6 Summary; Chapter 9. Reversible Agreements Without Externalities; 9.1 Two Examples; 9.2 Benignness; 9.3 Absorption and Efficiency; 9.4 Proofs; 9.5 Summary; Chapter 10. Reversible Agreements With Externalities
• 10.1 The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games10.2 The Baseline Model for Four or More Players; 10.3 Superadditive Games; 10.4 Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency; 10.5 Summary; Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation; Chapter 11. Blocking; 11.1 The Core Revisited; 11.2 Farsightedness in Blocking; 11.3 A First Pass at Farsightedness; 11.4 Externalities and Farsightedness; 11.5 Summary; Chapter 12. Irreversible Commitments; 12.1 Equilibrium Binding Agreements; 12.2 Farsightedness and Prediction; 12.3 Inefficiency; 12.4 An Application to Political Party Formation
• 12.5 Beyond Nested Deviations12.6 Summary; Chapter 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time; 13.1 Introduction; 13.2 An Informal Description; 13.3 A Process of Coalition Formation; 13.4 Deterministic Equilibrium Processes; 13.5 Stochastic Equilibrium Processes; 13.6 Proofs; 13.7 Summary; Chapter 14. Directions; 14.1 Coalition Formation Without Unanimity; 14.2 Equity Within Coalitions; 14.3 Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit; 14.4 Overlapping Coalitions; 14.5 Networks; 14.6 Coalition Formation With Nonbinding Agreements; 14.7 Incomplete Information; 14.8 Nontransferable Utility
• 14.9 Axiomatic Approaches