Corruption as a Last Resort : Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / / Kelly M. McMann.
Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and form...
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Place / Publishing House: | Ithaca : : Cornell University Press,, 2014. ©2014. |
Year of Publication: | 2014 |
Language: | English |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (201 p.) |
Notes: | Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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McMann, Kelly M., 1970- author. Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / Kelly M. McMann. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2014. ©2014. 1 online resource (201 p.) text txt computer c online resource cr Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph English Specialized. Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials.A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption.By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy. Includes bibliographical references and index. An absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis. Description based on print version record. CC BY-NC-ND Post-communism Economic aspects Asia, Central. Political corruption Asia, Central. Corruption Asia, Central. Asia, Central Politics and government 1991- Asia, Central Economic conditions 1991- Electronic books. 1-336-20321-8 0-8014-5327-5 |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
McMann, Kelly M., 1970- |
spellingShingle |
McMann, Kelly M., 1970- Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / An absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis. |
author_facet |
McMann, Kelly M., 1970- |
author_variant |
k m m km kmm |
author_role |
VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
McMann, Kelly M., 1970- |
title |
Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / |
title_sub |
Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / |
title_full |
Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / Kelly M. McMann. |
title_fullStr |
Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / Kelly M. McMann. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / Kelly M. McMann. |
title_auth |
Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / |
title_new |
Corruption as a Last Resort |
title_sort |
corruption as a last resort adapting to the market in central asia / |
publisher |
Cornell University Press, |
publishDate |
2014 |
physical |
1 online resource (201 p.) |
contents |
An absence of alternatives : a new framework for understanding corruption -- Alternatives to corruption and the impact of market reform : the arguments and their theoretical implications -- Bribery, favoritism, and clientelism : evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan -- Market actors as an unrealized alternative : the impact of market reforms -- Islamic institutions and secular charities : obstacles to providing substitute resources -- Families : the uneven impact of market reforms -- Reducing corruption : policy recommendations -- Appendix : statistical analysis. |
isbn |
0-8014-5490-5 0-8014-5491-3 1-336-20321-8 0-8014-5327-5 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HV - Social Pathology, Criminology |
callnumber-label |
HV6771 |
callnumber-sort |
HV 46771 A783 M36 42014 |
genre |
Electronic books. |
geographic |
Asia, Central Politics and government 1991- Asia, Central Economic conditions 1991- |
genre_facet |
Electronic books. |
geographic_facet |
Asia, Central. Asia, Central |
era_facet |
1991- |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
380 - Commerce, communications & transportation |
dewey-ones |
381 - Commerce |
dewey-full |
381.3 |
dewey-sort |
3381.3 |
dewey-raw |
381.3 |
dewey-search |
381.3 |
oclc_num |
894227715 979590348 922998607 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT mcmannkellym corruptionasalastresortadaptingtothemarketincentralasia |
status_str |
c |
ids_txt_mv |
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Corruption as a Last Resort Adapting to the Market in Central Asia / |
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