New perspectives on games and interaction / / edited by Krzysztof R. Apt, Robert Van Rooij.

• Superior document: Texts in logic and games ; v. 4
• Author: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Colloquium
• TeilnehmendeR: Apt, Krzysztof R., 1949-; Van Rooij, Robert, 1966-; Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Colloquium
• Year of Publication: 2008
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Texts in logic and games ; v. 4.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (331 pages) :; digital file(s).
• Notes: "In the period February 5-7, 2007 we organized in ... Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW) in Amsterdam the Academy Colloquium titled 'New Perspectives on Games and Interaction' ... this volumes consists of the contributions written by the speakers.'"--P. [7].

This volume is a collection of papers presented at the 2007 colloquium on new perspectives on games and interaction at the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam. The purpose of the colloquium was to clarify the uses of the concepts of game theory, and to identify promising new directions. This important collection testifies to the growing importance of game theory as a tool to capture the concepts of strategy, interaction, argumentation, communication, cooperation and competition. Also, it provides evidence for the richness of game theory and for its impressive and growing application.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents; Preface; The Logic of Conditional Doxastic Actions; Comments on 'The Logic of Conditional Doxastic Actions'; Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework; Yet more Modal Logic of Preference Change and Belief Revision; Meaningful Talk; A Study in the Pragmatic of Persuasion: a Game Theoretical Approach; On Glazer and Rubenstein on Persuasion; Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Infinite Multiplayer Games; Games in Language; 'Games That Make Sense': Logic, Language and Multi-Agent Interaction; Solution of Church's Problem: A Tutorial; Modal Dependence Logic

Declarations of DependenceBackward Induction and Common Strong Belief of Rationality; Efficient Coalitions in Boolean Games; Interpretation if Optimal Signals; A Criterion for the Existence of Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Markov Decision Processes