The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics
What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for tr...
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Place / Publishing House: | [Place of publication not identified] : Graduate Institute Publications, 2012 |
Year of Publication: | 2012 |
Language: | English |
Series: | eCahiers de l'Institut ;
15 |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (90 pages). |
Notes: | Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Hohmann, Sebastian Author The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics Graduate Institute Publications 2012 [Place of publication not identified] Graduate Institute Publications 2012 1 online resource (90 pages). text txt computer c online resource cr eCahiers de l'Institut ; 15 Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph English Includes bibliographical references. What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default. CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Political Science HILCC Law, Politics & Government HILCC Public Finance HILCC risks State | Nation financial globalisation non-state actors and civil society debt finance governance 2-940503-07-9 |
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English |
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author |
Hohmann, Sebastian |
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Hohmann, Sebastian The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics eCahiers de l'Institut ; |
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Hohmann, Sebastian |
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Hohmann, Sebastian |
title |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_full |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_fullStr |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_full_unstemmed |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_auth |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_new |
The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
title_sort |
the political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
series |
eCahiers de l'Institut ; |
series2 |
eCahiers de l'Institut ; |
publisher |
Graduate Institute Publications |
publishDate |
2012 |
physical |
1 online resource (90 pages). |
isbn |
2-940503-08-7 2-940503-07-9 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HJ - Public Finance |
callnumber-label |
HJ8015 |
callnumber-sort |
HJ 48015 |
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Not Illustrated |
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AT hohmannsebastian thepoliticaleconomyofsovereigndefaulttheoryandempirics AT hohmannsebastian politicaleconomyofsovereigndefaulttheoryandempirics |
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The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics |
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