Inner speech : : new voices / / Peter Langland-Hassan, Agustin Vicente.

• TeilnehmendeR: Langland-Hassan, Peter,; Vicente, Agustín, 1970-
• Place / Publishing House: Oxford : : Oxford University Press,, 2018.
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Edition: First edition.
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (336 pages)
• Notes: This edition previously issued in print: 2018.

'Inner Speech' focuses on a familiar and yet mysterious element of our daily lives. In light of renewed interest in the general connections between thought, language, and consciousness, this anthology develops a number of important new theories about internal voices and raises questions ab...

Table of Contents

• Cover
• Inner Speech: New Voices
• Copyright
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Contributors
• Introduction
• I.1 What Are the Proper Parts of Inner Speech, and How Do They Relate?
• I.1.1 What is the relation of inner speech's components to each other?
• I.2 Is Inner Speech the Expression of Thought, or Thought Itself?
• I.3 In What Ways Does Inner Speech Facilitate Self-Knowledge ?
• I.4 What Role Can Inner Speech Play in Explanations of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and "Inserted Thoughts"?
• I.5 Vygotsky's Complicated Legacy
• I.5.1 Inner speech for self-regulation
• I.5.2 Inner speech as internalization of conversations
• I.5.3 Inner speech as condensed and idiosyncratic
• I.6 Conclusion
• References
• Part I: The Nature of Inner Speech
• 1: The Causes and Contents of Inner Speech
• 1.1 Causes
• 1.1.1 Auditory imagination
• 1.1.2 Mental rehearsal
• 1.1.3 Inner speech selection
• 1.2 Contents
• 1.2.1 Outer speech
• 1.2.2 Inner speech: comprehension
• 1.2.3 Inner speech: content
• 1.2.4 Why so reliable?
• 1.2.5 Why no uncertainty?
• 1.3 Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• References
• 2: Inner Speech as the Internalization of Outer Speech
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Inner speech versus auditory imagery
• 2.2.1 The misleading identification
• 2.2.2 Does the analogy hold?
• 2.2.3 Auditory imagery as the perception of inner speech
• 2.2.4 Auditory imagery that represents inner speech versus auditory imagery that does not
• 2.2.5 Consciousness via the auditory imagery of inner speech
• 2.2.6 Some alternative accounts of the relation
• 2.3 Inner Speech as Internalized Conversation
• 2.3.1 Some unpersuasive arguments
• 2.3.2 The problem with Mentalese
• 2.3.3 Simple conversation
• 2.3.4 Conversation internalized
• 2.3.5 The nonlinguistic cognitive foundation
• Acknowledgments.
• References
• 3: From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Why Inner Speech Must Have an Auditory-Phonological Component
• 3.2.1 From phenomenology to essence
• 3.3 Some Objections Considered
• 3.3.1 Objection: I usually speak English
• that's why my inner speech always seems to be in English
• 3.3.2 Objection: My intentions reveal to me the language to which my inner speech is keyed
• 3.3.3 Objection: Inner speech could have a phonological component without being auditory
• 3.3.4 Objection: Motor imagery allows us to judge the language to which our inner speech is keyed
• 3.4 Inserted Thoughts, and the Language in Which They Occur
• 3.4.1 AVHs, inserted thoughts, and patient reports
• 3.4.2 Sensorimotor accounts of agency
• 3.4.3 A proposal for new diagnostic questions
• Acknowledgments
• References
• 4: Inner Speech and Mental Imagery: A Neuroscientific Perspective
• 4.1 Introduction
• 4.2 A Brief History of Neuroscientific Investigation of Inner Speech
• 4.3 Imaging Studies of Inner Speech
• 4.4 Studies of Inner Speech in Aphasia
• 4.5 The Neuroscience of Mental Imagery
• 4.6 Visual Imagery
• 4.7 Motor Imagery
• 4.8 Principles of Imagery
• Bibliography
• 5: A Cognitive Neuroscience View of Inner Language: To Predict and to Hear, See, Feel
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 The Abstract-Concrete Dimension of Inner Language
• 5.2.1 Arguments for the abstractness and amodality of inner language
• 5.2.2 Arguments for the concreteness and multimodality of inner language
• 5.2.2.1 PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES
• 5.2.2.2 CEREBRAL CORRELATES
• 5.2.2.3 ARTICULATORY SPECIFICATION
• 5.2.2.4 GESTURAL REPRESENTATION IN COVERT SIGN LANGUAGE
• 5.2.3 Coexistence of abstract-amodal and concrete-multimodal forms
• 5.3 The Sensory-Motor Dimension of Inner Language.
• 5.3.1 Arguments for a motor or enactive nature
• 5.3.2 Arguments for a sensory nature
• 5.4 Integrating the Sensory-Motor Nature of Inner Language into the "Predictive Control" Account
• 5.5 A Cerebral Landscape
• 5.6 Conclusion
• Acknowledgements
• References
• 6: Inner Speaking as Pristine Inner Experience
• 6.1 Characteristics of an Adequate Method
• 6.2 Descriptive Experience Sampling
• 6.3 Reflections on the Current Science of Inner Speech
• 6.3.1 The appeal to Vygotsky
• 6.3.2 Discriminations of phenomena
• 6.3.3 Introspection
• 6.3.4 Bracketing presuppositions
• 6.3.5 Indirect methods of investigating inner speech
• 6.3.6 Questionnaires and non-DES experience sampling
• 6.4 Apprehending in High Fidelity: A Case Study
• 6.5 Discussion
• References
• PART II: Inner Speech, Self-Reflection, and Self-Knowledge
• 7: Inner Speech, Determinacy, and Thinking Consciously about Thoughts
• 7.1 Intentional Ascent and Semantic Ascent
• 7.2 Indeterminacy and Ambiguity in Inner Speech
• 7.3 The Structure of Inner Speech Episodes
• 7.4 Thinking Consciously vs. Being Conscious of a Thought
• References
• 8: Inner Speech and Outer Thought
• 8.1 Introduction
• 8.2 Inner Speech as Format
• 8.3 Inner Speech as Activity
• 8.4 Thinking as Self-Communication?
• 8.5 Thinking as Dual
• 8.6 Type 2 Thinking as Activity
• 8.7 Speaking as Thinking
• 8.8 Speaking as Judging and Deciding
• 8.9 Conclusion
• References
• 9: When Inner Speech Misleads
• 9.1 Introduction
• 9.2 Content without Commitment: Inner Speech as Imagination
• 9.3 Inner Speech as Speech
• 9.3.1 Inner speech as productive rather than re-creative
• 9.3.2 Inner speech acts as the main form of inner speech
• 9.4 The Experiential Content of Speech Experience
• 9.5 The Experiential Content of Inner Speech
• 9.6 The Ways in Which Inner Speech Can (and Can't) Mislead.
• 9.7 Conclusion
• References
• 10: Know Thyself: Beliefs vs. Desires in Inner Speech
• 10.1 Inner Speech and Communication
• 10.2 The Expression of Beliefs vs. Desires by Assertions
• 10.3 Inner Speech and Self-Knowledge
• 10.3.1 Argument
• 10.3.2 Objections
• 10.4 Beliefs and Desires
• 10.5 Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• References
• 11: The Self-Reflective Functions of Inner Speech: Thirteen Years Later
• 11.1 Introduction
• 11.2 Overview
• 11.2.1 Self-reflection
• 11.2.2 Inner speech
• 11.3 Inner Speech Involvement in Self-Reflection
• 11.4 Empirical Evidence
• 11.4.1 Questionnaires
• 11.4.2 Self-reflection deficits following inner speech loss
• 11.4.3 LIFG/inner speech involvement in self-referential tasks
• 11.4.4 Self-reported inner speech about the self
• 11.4.5 Inner speech and awareness of mind-wandering
• 11.4.6 The self as narrative
• 11.5 Theoretical Considerations
• 11.5.1 Inner speech can reproduce social mechanisms leading to self-reflection
• 11.5.2 Self-reflection as a problem-solving process
• 11.5.3 Self-distancing/decoupling
• 11.5.4 Verbal labelling
• 11.6 Conclusion
• References
• 12: Activity, Agency, and Inner Speech Pathology
• 12.1 Introduction
• 12.2 Classic Motor Control and Comparator Accounts of Inner Speech Pathology
• 12.2.1 Classic motor control
• 12.2.2 The standard comparator account of inner speech pathology
• 12.2.3 The alternative to the standard comparator account
• 12.2.4 Support for the standard and alternative comparator accounts of inner speech pathology
• 12.2.5 Summary of standard and alternative comparator accounts
• 12.3 Predictive Processing Accounts of Inner Speech Pathology
• 12.3.1 Overview of Bayesian predictive processing
• 12.3.2 Enhanced standard approach
• 12.3.3 Active inference agency approach
• 12.3.4 Reality monitoring approach.
• 12.3.5 Summary of predictive processing and active inference approaches to inner speech and verbal imagery pathology
• 12.4 Conclusions
• References
• Index.