Models in Microeconomic Theory / / Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.

"Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and...

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Year of Publication:2020
Language:English
Physical Description:1 electronic resource (362 p.)
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Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Personal note
  • Preface
  • Part I Individual behavior
  • 1 Preferences and utility
  • 1.1 Preferences
  • 1.2 Preference formation
  • 1.3 An experiment
  • 1.4 Utility functions
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 2 Choice
  • 2.1 Choice and rational choice
  • 2.2 Rationalizing choice
  • 2.3 Property alpha
  • 2.4 Satisficing
  • 2.5 The money pump argument
  • 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 3 Preferences under uncertainty
  • 3.1 Lotteries
  • 3.2 Preferences over lotteries
  • 3.3 Expected utility
  • 3.4 Theory and experiments
  • 3.5 Risk aversion
  • 7 Monopoly
  • 7.1 Basic model
  • 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market
  • 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly
  • 7.4 Implicit discrimination
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • Part II Equilibrium
  • 8 A jungle
  • 8.1 Model
  • 8.2 Equilibrium
  • 8.3 Pareto stability
  • 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle
  • 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation?
  • 8.6 Externalities
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 9 A market
  • 9.1 Model
  • 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium
  • 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability
  • 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium
  • Problems
  • 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations
  • 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches
  • 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection
  • 13.3 A fishing economy
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 14 A market with asymmetric information
  • 14.1 Introductory model
  • 14.2 Labor market with education
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • Part III Game theory
  • 15 Strategic games
  • 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium
  • 15.2 Basic examples
  • 15.3 Economic examples
  • 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium
  • 15.5 Strictly competitive games
  • 15.6 Kantian equilibrium
  • 15.7 Mixed strategies
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 10 An exchange economy
  • 10.1 Model
  • 10.2 Competitive equilibrium
  • 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium
  • 10.4 Reopening trade
  • 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability
  • 10.6 The core
  • 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions
  • 10.8 Manipulability
  • 10.9 Edgeworth box
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 11 Variants of an exchange economy
  • 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money
  • 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 12 A market with consumers and producers
  • 12.1 Production economy
  • 12.2 An economy with capital and labor
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 4 Consumer preferences
  • 4.1 Bundles of goods
  • 4.2 Preferences over bundles
  • 4.3 Monotonicity
  • 4.4 Continuity
  • 4.5 Convexity
  • 4.6 Differentiability
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 5 Consumer behavior
  • 5.1 Budget sets
  • 5.2 Demand functions
  • 5.3 Rational consumer
  • 5.4 Differentiable preferences
  • 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function
  • 5.6 Properties of demand functions
  • Problems
  • Notes
  • 6 Producer behavior
  • 6.1 The producer
  • 6.2 Output maximization
  • 6.3 Profit maximization
  • 6.4 Cost function
  • 6.5 Producers' preferences
  • Problems
  • Notes