Epistemic duties : : new arguments, new angles / / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.

There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related...

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Superior document:Routledge studies in epistemology
TeilnehmendeR:
Place / Publishing House:New York, New York ;, London : : Routledge,, [2021]
©2021
Year of Publication:2020
2021
Language:English
Series:Routledge studies in epistemology.
Physical Description:1 online resource (ix, 301 pages).
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spelling McCain, Kevin edt
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.
Taylor & Francis 2020
New York, New York ; London : Routledge, [2021]
©2021
1 online resource (ix, 301 pages).
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Routledge studies in epistemology
Includes bibliographical references and index.
There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
Description based on print version record.
English
Knowledge, Theory of.
Duty.
Ethics.
Andrew Reisner
Anne Meylan
Anthony Robert Booth
belief
Clayton Littlejohn
dialogical foundationalism
doxastic dilemma
doxastic duties
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
epistemic duties
epistemic normativity
epistemic obligation
epistemic tension
epistemology
evidence
functions
implicit bias
Jennifer Lackey
Jonathan Matheson
Kevin McCain
Lindsay Rettler
Lisa Bortolotti
Luis Oliveira
Mark T. Nelson
Matthias Steup
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
obligation
open-mindedness
ought to believe
ought to reflect
McCain, Kevin, 1980- editor.
Stapleford, Scott, editor.
0-367-14110-8
Routledge studies in epistemology.
language English
format eBook
author2 McCain, Kevin, 1980-
Stapleford, Scott,
author_facet McCain, Kevin, 1980-
Stapleford, Scott,
author2_variant k m km
k m km
s s ss
author2_role TeilnehmendeR
TeilnehmendeR
title Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles /
spellingShingle Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles /
Routledge studies in epistemology
title_sub new arguments, new angles /
title_full Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.
title_fullStr Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.
title_full_unstemmed Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.
title_auth Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles /
title_new Epistemic duties :
title_sort epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles /
series Routledge studies in epistemology
series2 Routledge studies in epistemology
publisher Taylor & Francis
Routledge,
publishDate 2020
2021
physical 1 online resource (ix, 301 pages).
isbn 0-429-03021-5
0-429-63862-0
0-367-14110-8
callnumber-first B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion
callnumber-subject BD - Speculative Philosophy
callnumber-label BD161
callnumber-sort BD 3161 E657 42021
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 100 - Philosophy & psychology
dewey-tens 120 - Epistemology
dewey-ones 121 - Epistemology
dewey-full 121
dewey-sort 3121
dewey-raw 121
dewey-search 121
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