Epistemic duties : : new arguments, new angles / / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.
There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related...
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Superior document: | Routledge studies in epistemology |
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Place / Publishing House: | New York, New York ;, London : : Routledge,, [2021] ©2021 |
Year of Publication: | 2020 2021 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Routledge studies in epistemology.
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (ix, 301 pages). |
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(CKB)4100000011392774 (MiAaPQ)EBC6307428 (oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/26320 (EXLCZ)994100000011392774 |
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McCain, Kevin edt Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford. Taylor & Francis 2020 New York, New York ; London : Routledge, [2021] ©2021 1 online resource (ix, 301 pages). text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology Includes bibliographical references and index. There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. Description based on print version record. English Knowledge, Theory of. Duty. Ethics. Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect McCain, Kevin, 1980- editor. Stapleford, Scott, editor. 0-367-14110-8 Routledge studies in epistemology. |
language |
English |
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McCain, Kevin, 1980- Stapleford, Scott, |
author_facet |
McCain, Kevin, 1980- Stapleford, Scott, |
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TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR |
title |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / |
spellingShingle |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / Routledge studies in epistemology |
title_sub |
new arguments, new angles / |
title_full |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford. |
title_fullStr |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford. |
title_auth |
Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / |
title_new |
Epistemic duties : |
title_sort |
epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / |
series |
Routledge studies in epistemology |
series2 |
Routledge studies in epistemology |
publisher |
Taylor & Francis Routledge, |
publishDate |
2020 2021 |
physical |
1 online resource (ix, 301 pages). |
isbn |
0-429-03021-5 0-429-63862-0 0-367-14110-8 |
callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-subject |
BD - Speculative Philosophy |
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BD161 |
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BD 3161 E657 42021 |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-tens |
120 - Epistemology |
dewey-ones |
121 - Epistemology |
dewey-full |
121 |
dewey-sort |
3121 |
dewey-raw |
121 |
dewey-search |
121 |
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(CKB)4100000011392774 (MiAaPQ)EBC6307428 (oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/26320 (EXLCZ)994100000011392774 |
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Routledge studies in epistemology |
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Epistemic duties : new arguments, new angles / |
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