Moral uncertainty / / William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord.
How should we make decisions when we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do? Decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty is underexplored terrain: MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord argue that there are distinctive norms by which it is governed, and which depend on the natur...
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Superior document: | Oxford scholarship online |
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Place / Publishing House: | Oxford : : Oxford University Press,, 2020. |
Year of Publication: | 2020 |
Edition: | New product. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Oxford scholarship online.
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource :; illustrations (black and white, and colour). |
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Summary: | How should we make decisions when we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do? Decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty is underexplored terrain: MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord argue that there are distinctive norms by which it is governed, and which depend on the nature of one's moral beliefs. |
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Audience: | Specialized. |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 0191033642 0191789100 0191033634 |
Hierarchical level: | Monograph |
Statement of Responsibility: | William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord. |