Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy : : A Study of the Moral Foundations of Descartes' Theory of Knowledge / / Marcelo de Araujo.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Araujo, Marcelo de,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2012]; ©2003
• Year of Publication: 2012
• Edition: Reprint 2012
• Language: English
• Series: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie , 58
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (237 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Acknowledgements --; Contents --; INTRODUCTION --; CHAPTER ONE. DESCARTES’ THEORY OF JUDGEMENT --; CHAPTER TWO. TWO CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM --; CHAPTER THREE. SELF-DECEPTION AS A MENTAL STATE --; CHAPTER FOUR. FREEDOM, AUTONOMY, AND SCEPTICISM --; CHAPTER FIVE. THE SCIENCE OF GOOD LIVING --; CHAPTER SIX. DESCARTES ON VIRTUE ETHICS --; CONCLUSION --; BIBLIOGRAPHY --; Index Nominum
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110910957; 9783110238570; 9783110238488; 9783110636949
• ISSN: 0344-8142
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110910957
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Marcelo de Araujo.

Descartes' Skeptizismus, dem in der Regel nur eine epistemische Bedeutung zugesprochen wird, erweist sich in der Lesart Araujos als relevant für eine grundlegende moralische Frage: die nach der menschlichen Autonomie überhaupt. How much does what we think depend on what we want? Descartes' much-discussed position has often been interpreted to mean that we hold an opinion as the result of a decision. In Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy, Araujo argues against this interpretation, asserting that we retain control over our opinions only through selective attention. Even for this limited control, however, Cartesian Scepticism implies the possibility of self-delusion, symbolized in the writings of Descartes by the figure of the evil god. Hence, the existence of an evil god would not only cast doubt on our claims to knowledge but also jeopardize our freedom. In this new interpretation, the Cartesian Scepticism, which is usually ascribed only epistemic significance, proves relevant for a fundamental moral question, that of human autonomy in general.