Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy. / Volume 1, : What is Truth? / / ed. by Richard Schantz.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• MitwirkendeR: ALSTON, WILLIAM P.,; ARMSTRONG, DAVID. M .,; BOYD, RICHARD,; BRANDOM, ROBERT B.,; DEVITT, MICHAEL,; DUMMETT, MICHAEL,; David, Marian,; GROVER, DOROTHY,; GUPTA, ANIL,; HINTIKKA, JAAKKO,; HORWICH, PAUL,; INWAGEN, PETER VAN,; KÜNNE, WOLFGANG,; MCGINN, COLIN,; PUNTEL, LORENZ Β.,; ROSENBERG, JAY F.,; SCHANTZ, RICHARD,; WALKER, RALPH C. S.,; WIGGINS, DAVID,; WILLIAMS, MICHAEL,
• HerausgeberIn: Schantz, Richard,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2011]; ©2001
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Edition: Reprint 2012
• Language: English
• Series: Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy ; Volume 1
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (340 p.)

In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: what is truth? To arrive at an answer, two further questions need to be addressed in this context: 1) Does truth possess any essence, any inner nature? and 2) If so, what does this nature consist of? The present discussion focuses on the antagonism between substantial or robust theories of truth, with correspondence theory taking the lead, and deflationist or minimalist views, which have been commanding an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Whereas substantial theories proceed from the premise that truth has an essence, and that therefore the objective is to discover this essence, the challenge presented by deflationism is to dispense with this very premise.

International führende Autoren wenden sich in Originalbeiträgen einer der wichtigsten Fragen der theoretischen Philosophie zu: Was ist Wahrheit? In diesem Zusammenhang sind zwei andere Fragen von grundlegender Bedeutung: (1) Hat Wahrheit überhaupt ein Wesen, eine innere Natur? (2) Wenn ja, worin besteht diese Natur? Im Mittelpunkt der gegenwärtigen Debatte steht der Antagonismus zwischen substantiellen oder robusten Wahrheitstheorien, allen voran der Korrespondenztheorie, und deflationistischen oder minimalistischen Auffassungen, die in den letzten Jahren immer stärkere Beachtung gefunden haben. Während substantielle Theorien von der Voraussetzung ausgehen, Wahrheit habe eine Natur, und folgerichtig sei das Ziel zu verfolgen, diese Natur zu entdecken, besteht die Herausforderung des Deflationismus just darin, diese Voraussetzung über Bord zu werfen.

Table of Contents

I-IV -- Contents -- Introduction -- I The Correspondence Theory -- Truth : Concept and Property -- Truths and Truthmakers -- Truth Through Thick and Thin -- The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth -- Truth, Meaning, and Reference -- II Deflationism Defended -- Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth -- On Locating Our Interest in Truth -- Norms of Truth and Meaning -- On Some Critics of Deflationism -- III Deflationism Attacked -- Minimalism and the Facts About Truth -- Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth -- The Truth about Truth -- Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences -- IV Tarski Challenged -- An Argument Against Tarski's Convention Τ -- What is Truth? Stay for an Answer -- V Alternative Approaches -- The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth -- Truth: A Prolegomenon to a General Theory -- How Not to Misunderstand Peirce - A Pragmatist Account of Truth -- A Problem about Truth -- An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Names -- Contributors