Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals / / ed. by Martin Grajner, Pedro Schmechtig.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2016 Part 1
• MitwirkendeR: Briesen, Jochen,; Carter, J. Adam,; Chrisman, Matthew,; Cuneo, Terence,; Fassio, Davide,; Gordon, Emma C.,; Grajner, Martin,; Kyriacou, Christos,; Littlejohn, Clayton,; Mitova, Veli,; Piller, Christian,; Pritchard, Duncan,; Reisner, Andrew,; Schmechtig, Pedro,; Simion, Mona,; Stei, Erik,; Unwin, Nicholas,; Vahid, Hamid,; Wrenn, Chase,
• HerausgeberIn: Grajner, Martin,; Schmechtig, Pedro,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2016]; ©2016
• Year of Publication: 2016
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (IX, 453 p.)

In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.

What are epistemic reasons? What are epistemic norms? What is our basic epistemic goal? In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms, and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. Pursuing these questions has not only proven fertile for our understanding of key concepts and phenomena studied in epistemology, but also for a wide area of issues in philosophy of mind and action and in philosophy of language and meta-ethics. The present volume brings together eighteen essays, seventeen of them new, by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) different aspects of epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism, and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers and students of philosophy interested in epistemic normativity and beyond.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals -- I. Epistemic Reasons -- In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons -- Learning from Learning from our Mistakes -- Destabilizing the Error Theory -- Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against -- II. Epistemic Norms -- Belief, Truth and Radical Disagreement -- Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard -- Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards -- Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations -- What do I care About Epistemic Norms? -- III Epistemic Consequentialism -- Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism -- Tradeoffs, Self-Promotion, and Epistemic Teleology -- Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle -- How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker’s Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism -- IV. Epistemic Goals and Values -- External Goals and Inherent Norms – A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity -- The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg -- Ought to Believe, Evidential Understanding and the Pursuit of Wisdom -- Epistemic Axiology -- Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief -- Contributors -- Author Index -- Subject Index