Free Will, Causality and the Self / / Atle Ottesen Søvik.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2016 Part 1
• VerfasserIn: Søvik, Atle Ottesen,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2016]; ©2016
• Year of Publication: 2016
• Language: English
• Series: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , 71
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (VII, 183 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Foreword --; Contents --; 1. Introduction --; 2. Causality --; 3. The Self --; 4. Free Will --; 5. Answers to Objections --; Bibliography --; Name index --; Subject index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110474688; 9783110762501; 9783110701005; 9783110485103; 9783110485301
• ISSN: 2198-2066
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110474688
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Atle Ottesen Søvik.

A major goal for compatibilists is to avoid the luck problem and to include all the facts from neuroscience and natural science in general which purportedly show that the brain works in a law-governed and causal way like any other part of nature. Libertarians, for their part, want to avoid the manipulation argument and demonstrate that very common and deep seated convictions about freedom and responsibility are true: it can really be fundamentally up to us as agents to determine that the future should be either A or B. This book presents a theory of free will which integrates the main motivations of compatibilists and libertarians, while at the same time avoiding their problems. The so-called event-causal libertarianism is the libertarian account closest to compatibilitsm, as it claims there is indeterminism in the mind of an agent. The charge of compatibilists, however, is that this position is impaired by the problem of luck. This book is unique in arguing that free will in a strong sense of the term does not require indeterminism in the brain, only indeterminism somewhere in the world which there plausibly is.