Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception : : How We Relate to the World / / Nadja El Kassar.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2015 Part 1
• VerfasserIn: El Kassar, Nadja,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2015]; ©2015
• Year of Publication: 2015
• Language: English
• Series: Ideen & Argumente ,
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (363 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Acknowledgments --; Contents --; Introduction --; Part I Conceptualism --; 1 Introducing Conceptualism --; 2 Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism --; 3 Examining McDowell’s Revised Conceptualism --; Part II Relationism --; 4 Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance --; 5 Relationism as Anti-Representationalism --; 6 Why McDowell’s Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis’s Anti-Representationalist Criticism --; Part III Relational Conceptualism --; 7 Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception --; 8 Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism --; Part IV. Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science --; 9 Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism --; References --; Author Index --; Subject Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110445626; 9783110762518; 9783110700985; 9783110439687; 9783110438680
• ISSN: 1862-1147
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110445626
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Nadja El Kassar.

How does perceptual experience make us knowledgeable about the world? In this book Nadja El Kassar argues that an informed answer requires a novel theory of perception: perceptual experience involves conceptual capacities and consists in a relation between a perceiver and the world. Contemporary theories of perception disagree about the role of content and conceptual capacities in perceptual experience. In her analysis El Kassar scrutinizes the arguments of conceptualist and relationist theories, thereby exposing their limitations for explaining the epistemic role of perceptual experience. Against this background she develops her novel theory of epistemically significant perception. Her theory improves on current accounts by encompassing both the epistemic role of perceptual experiences and its perceptual character. Central claims of her theory receive additional support from work in vision science, making this book an original contribution to the philosophy of perception.