Varieties of Skepticism : : Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell / / ed. by James Conant, Andrea Kern.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• MitwirkendeR: Affeldt, Steven G.,; Bridges, Jason,; Conant, James,; Diamond, Cora,; Franks, Paul,; Glendinning, Simon,; Hamawaki, Arata,; Kern, Andrea,; Menke, Christoph,; Mulhall, Stephen,; Putnam, Hilary,; Rödl, Sebastian,; Stone, Martin,; Wellmer, Albrecht,; Williams, Michael,
• HerausgeberIn: Conant, James,; Kern, Andrea,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2014]; ©2014
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Language: English
• Series: Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research , 5
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (458 p.)

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered - above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell - and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Introduction: From Kant to Cavell -- Part I: After Kant+ -- Skepticism after Kant -- Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes: Sellars and Skepticism -- Why Do Our Reasons Come to an End? -- Skepticism, Stroud, and the Contextuality of Knowledge -- Finite Knowledge -- Part II: After Wittgenstein -- The Hardness of the Soft: Wittgenstein’s Early Thought About Skepticism -- Skepticism in Interpretation -- Interpretation: Everyday and Philosophical -- Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called -- Part III: After Cavell -- Inner Constancy, Outer Variation: Stanley Cavell on Grammar, Criteria, and Rules -- The Normativity of the Natural -- Tragedy and Skepticism: On Hamlet -- Cavell, Skepticism, and the Idea of Philosophical Criticism -- Cavell and Other Animals -- Contributors -- Index of Persons