How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective? / / Andrea Clausen.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Clausen, Andrea,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013]; ©2008
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Logos : Studien zur Logik, Sprachphilosophie und Metaphysik , 6
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (267 p.)

In this book, Andrea Clausen intends to reconcile Kripke's point according to which conceptual content has to be considered as being constituted by social, normative practice - by a process of mutual assessments - with the view that the content of empirical assertions has to be conceived as objective. She criticizes approaches that explicate content-constitutive practice in non-normative terms, namely in terms of sanctioning behavior (Haugeland, Pettit, Esfeld). She also rejects a pragmatist reading of Heidegger that proceeds from thoroughly normative but pre-conceptual practice. She develops and defends a particular reading of an approach that conceives normative, conceptually articulated practice - giving and asking for reasons - as primitive (Brandom, McDowell).

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- Part I. The problem -- 1. The objectivity of content -- 2. The normative and social character of content -- Part II. Critical discussion of proposed answers -- 3. A naturalistic answer -- 4. A pragmatist reading of Heidegger – a middle position? -- 5. A primitivist answer -- Bibliography -- Backmatter