From Psychology to Neuroscience : : A New Reductive Account / / Patrice Soom.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Soom, Patrice,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013]; ©2011
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind , 21
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (318 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; TABLE OF CONTENTS --; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --; 1. INTRODUCTION --; 2. THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION --; 3. ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM --; 4. PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE --; 5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM --; 6. REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES --; 7. REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE: CASES STUDIES --; 8. FINAL REMARKS --; BIBLIOGRAPHY --; INDEX
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110322620; 9783110238570; 9783110238488; 9783110636949; 9783110331226; 9783110331219
• ISSN: 2198-1884
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110322620
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Patrice Soom.

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.