The Rei(g)n of ‘Rule’ / / Dana Riesenfeld.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Riesenfeld, Dana,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013]; ©2010
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Aporia , 2
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (132 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Table of Contents --; Introduction --; I. Rules, norms, conventions and necessity --; 1. Why norms are not conventions and conventions are not norms --; 2. Cavell on normative necessity: The philosopher, the baker, and the pantomime of caution --; II. Rules as conventions vs. rules as norms in the rule-following debates --; 3. What is a rule and what ought it to be --; III. Twisted Language --; 4. Davidson on rules, conventions and norms --; 5. Searle on rules (of rationality, conversation and speech acts) --; Conclusion --; References --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110321869; 9783110238570; 9783110238488; 9783110636949; 9783110331226; 9783110331219
• ISSN: 2197-862X
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110321869
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Dana Riesenfeld.

The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either as norms or as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define ‘rule’ has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that ‘rule’ has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.