Self and World : : From Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology / / Bruin Carleton Christensen.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Christensen, Bruin Carleton,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2008]; ©2008
• Year of Publication: 2008
• Language: English
• Series: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie , 89
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (394 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Introduction --; Chapter One: Escaping the Oscillation --; Chapter Two: Regaining the World --; Chapter Three: Perceptual Appearance and Perceptual World --; Chapter Four: The View from Sideways-on, Common Factors and Other Loose Ends --; Chapter Five: Two Senses of Nature? --; Chapter Six: From Nature to World --; Chapter Seven: On the Brink of Phenomenology --; Conclusion: From McDowell to Husserl and Beyond --; Backmatter
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110212174; 9783110238570; 9783110238488; 9783110636949; 9783110212129; 9783110212136; 9783110209426
• ISSN: 0344-8142
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110212174
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Bruin Carleton Christensen.

This book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger in order to provide an alternative elaboration of John McDowell’s thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as a genuine unity of spontaneity ('concept’) and receptivity ('intuition’). This alternative elaboration permits clarification of McDowell’s critique of Donald Davidson and development of an alternative conception of perceptual experience giving clear sense to McDowell’s claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so inherently in touch with its world that scepticism about the latter must be incoherent. It also permits development of a more accurate, historically oriented critique of the metaphysics constraining one to construe perceptual experience in ways which misrepresent how self-conscious subjectivity bears upon the world. It shows that many of McDowell’s meta-philosophical views are implicitly Husserlian and that had McDowell developed them further, he would have avoided the paradoxical meta-philosophy he adopts from Wittgenstein. In conclusion, it intimates the central weakness in Husserl’s position which takes one from Husserl to Heidegger. The book is written in terms accessible to analytic philosophers and will thus enable them to see the central differences between analytic and phenomenological approaches to intentionality and self-consciousness.