Peacemaking in Rwanda : : The Dynamics of Failure / / Bruce D. Jones.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Lynne Rienner Press Complete eBook-Package 2013-2000
• VerfasserIn: Jones, Bruce D.,
• MitwirkendeR: Jones, Bruce D.,
• Place / Publishing House: Boulder : : Lynne Rienner Publishers, , [2022]; ©2001
• Year of Publication: 2022
• Language: English
• Series: A project of the International Peace Institute
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (209 p.)

Bruce Jones investigates why the wide-ranging efforts to forestall genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994 failed so miserably. Jones traces the individual and collective impact of both official and unofficial mediation efforts, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian aid. Providing theoretical and empirical evidence, he shows that the failure of the peace process was not the result of lack of effort, or even the weakness of any particular effort. Rather, it was due to a combination of factors: the lack of connections among the various attempts at conflict resolution; the intransigence of the warring parties; the lack of a coherent strategy for managing spoilers in the peace process; and weak international support. Peacemaking in Rwanda generates critical insights into the limits of our contemporary systems for conflict prevention and management, serving as a sobering argument for reform of the international conflict management system.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction: The Rwandan Civil War in Context -- 2. War and Genocide: History of the Rwandan Conflict -- 3. Early Peacemaking Efforts: Regional Prenegotiation -- 4. The Arusha Negotiations: Mediation and Facilitation -- 5. UN Peacekeeping and the Collapse of Arusha: Implementation Efforts -- 6. Genocide, Crisis, and the Renewal of War: The Consequences of Failure -- 7. The Dynamics of Peacemaking in Rwanda: Conclusions and Implications -- Acronyms -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Book